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"UNCHAIN THE CHILDREN": GAULT, THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE, AND SHACKLING
Bernard P. Perlmutter*
It is certainly legitimate to write a history of punishment against
the background of moral ideas or legal structures. But can one
write such a history against the background of a history of bodies,
when such systems of punishment claim to have only the secret
souls of criminals as their objective?
-Michel Foucault'
Cause every time they put you in the courthouse, they shackle you,
you know they keep you waiting and you know, sit down and wait.
But when you go into a program they shackle you too and you
gotta sit there and wait but it ain't the same, you know, you get to
at least see freedom. But when you're in the courthouse you feel
like there ain't no freedom. They can lock your, you know, they
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1. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 25 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Pantheon Books 1st ed. 1977) (1975).
2. Interview by Juvenile Shackling Voice Project with Miami-Dade County juvenile offender, in Miami,
Fla. (Mar. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Voice Project] (interviewee first shackled at age fourteen) (interview on file with
author).
The Juvenile Shackling Voice Project is a collaborative project with Bruce J. Winick, Professor of
Law, Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at the University of Miami (and co-founder of Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence), the Miami-Dade Public Defender, and Miami artist and attorney Xavier Cortada. The Voice Project seeks
to add the voices of youth to public discourse about courtroom shackling practices, to reform the practices through
public education and advocacy, and to teach law students to apply principles of therapeutic jurisprudence.
Students in Professor Winick's Spring 2007 Law and Psychology seminar conducted interviews with
approximately 12 juvenile offenders to elicit their views about being shackled. As part of the public education
phase of the project, Xavier Cortada is producing a canvas about shackling using drawings and messages submit-
ted by the juveniles. The canvas will be exhibited throughout Florida in connection with efforts to focus public
attention on reform of this practice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a Tallahassee courtroom, an eleven year-old girl, 3-foot-7-inches tall, is "led
to juvenile court wearing a belly chain connected to both handcuffs and leg irons-
For descriptions of previous Voice Project collaborations see Bernard P. Perlmutter, George's Story:
Voice and Transformation Through the Teaching and Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School
Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST.'THoMAS L. REv. 561, 563 n. 9 (2005); Carolyn S. Salisbury, From Violence and
Victimization to Voice and Validation: Incorporating Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Children's Law Clinic, 17
ST. THOMAS L. REv. 623 (2005).
For other discussions of the importance of acknowledging youth voice in the attorney-client relation-
ship, in lawyer ethics, and in discourse on child welfare and juvenile justice policy, see, e.g., Annette R. Appell,
Children's Voice and Justice: Lawyering for Children in the Twenty-First Century, 6 NEV. L.J. 692 (2006); Janet
A. Chaplan, Youth Perspectives on Lawyers' Ethics: A Report on Seven Interviews, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1763
(1996); Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child's
Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 245 (2005); Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice,
and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 89 (2002);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'Rights, 14 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1747 (1993).
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usually reserved for adults who are flight risks or charged with first-degree mur-
der.",3 Throughout Florida each day, the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)
shackles detained children when they are transported to court, and the chains often
remain on as they stand before judges, regardless of the child's age, height, weight,
gender, offense, risk of flight, or threat to public safety. These children routinely
appear before judges wearing metal handcuffs, metal leg shackles and sometimes
belly chains. In several counties, children are escorted through open areas of the
courthouse in plain view of the general public and then held in the courtroom in
handcuffs and leg irons for hours at a time. Ironically, while all detained children
at the pre-adjudicatory stage of the delinquency process are subject to a blanket
policy of shackling in juvenile court, it is constitutionally impermissible for states
to indiscriminately shackle convicted adult defendants even at the penalty phase of
a capital case.4
The practice of requiring all detained children to appear in court in chains has
recently been the subject of legal challenges, legislative advocacy, and a national
campaign to influence public opinion in favor of ending this practice as inhumane,
degrading, and illegal. The Miami-Dade County Public Defender's Office led the
charge, filing a series of groundbreaking motions for children to "appear free from
degrading and unlawful restraints." 5 The motions spawned similar litigation in
other parts of Florida and beyond Florida challenging, as contrary to principles of
constitutional, state and international law, and the very purposes of juvenile delin-
quency statutes, the courts' use of exceptional restraint procedures without an indi-
vidualized showing of necessity.
The challenges summoned various legal theories including that shackling chil-
dren violates the child's right to due process, interferes with the right to counsel
and to participate in his or her defense under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I sections 9 and 16 of the
Florida Constitution, violates the detained child's core right to be free from unnec-
essary bodily restraint under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and article I section 9 of the Florida Constitution, contravenes interna-
tional human rights law, and violates the child's right to be free from physical or
emotional abuse under state law.
The litigation, public education, and other law reform efforts portrayed juve-
nile shackling as gratuitously punitive, counter-therapeutic, medically and psycho-
logically harmful, an affront to the dignity of the children and the decorum of juve-
nile court proceedings, and antithetical to the juvenile court's very objectives of
individualized assessment and rehabilitation. Relying on psychological and medi-
cal expert opinion, the challenges to the legality and harmful effects of the practice
3. Jan Pudlow, Bar Panel Urges: Unchain the Children: Committee Takes Issue with 'Indiscriminate
Shackling' of Juveniles, THE FLORIDA BAR NEWS, Oct. 1, 2006, 1, 4.
4. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005).
5. The motions, addenda, memoranda, reports, photographs, and newspaper articles can be found on the
Miami-Dade Public Defender web site. Miami Dade Public Defender, Unchain the Children: Public Defender
Challenges Shackling of Juveniles, http://www.pdmiami.conunchainthechildren.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
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focused on the child's feelings and perception of the treatment accorded to him or
her by being held in shackles.
The prevalence of shackling, not just in Florida, but in many jurisdictions
across the U.S.,6 suggests that the original conception of the juvenile court as a
rehabilitative social welfare institution has devolved into a punitive system that, as
one leading critic of the contemporary juvenile court notes, "provides young of-
fenders with neither therapy nor justice.",7  Parading children through the court-
house in handcuffs and leg irons not only shocks the conscience in the post-Gaul?8
due process era, but is also certainly anathema to the pre-Gault vision of the juve-
nile court as a paternalistic institution dispensing careful, compassionate, individu-
alized medical treatment for children afflicted with a variety of social ills or pa-
thologies. 9
This article examines the practice of shackling detained juveniles in light of the
historical conception of juvenile court and of the Gault decision. Part II gives a
short history of the practice from the point of view of those who defend it as a nec-
essary courtroom security measure and those who oppose it as unlawful and de-
grading, including some of the children who have been subjected to it. Part III
addresses Gault, focusing on its narrow holding and broader policy implications for
the constitutional rights of children. The broader policy principles articulated by
Justice Fortas in that case derived, in part, from social science research suggesting
that the "appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderli-
ness-the essentials of due process"'°--promote therapeutic values for children.
This article asks whether the practice of shackling would be countenanced by
the Gault Court and gives two reasons why it would not. First, inasmuch as the
practice constitutes a serious deprivation of the fundamental liberty interest to be
free from external restraint, due process requires that the court have a procedure,
based on constitutional principle, for making an individualized determination that a
child needs to be shackled. Second, the blanket shackling policy is anathema to the
historical rehabilitative aims of the juvenile justice system and is anti-therapeutic.
6. According to USA TODAY, "in 28 states, some juvenile courts routinely keep defendants in restraints
during court appearances." Martha T. Moore, Should Kids Go to Court in Chains?, USA TODAY, Jun. 17, 2007, at
IA. Cf Affidavit of Dr. Marty Beyer, 6-7, discussed infra Part II.D.2, available at
http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren.htm/AppendixDBeyer.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2007) (observing
that throughout the country children "are seldom handcuffed or shackled in juvenile or family courts," but only in
those "rare situations" when the child "poses an imminent threat" to the safety of others in the courtroom). See
also infra note 167 and Appendix (summarizing juvenile shackling practices in other jurisdictions).
7. Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility and Sentencing Pol-
icy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 68 (1997); see also Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991).
8. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1909) (attributing necessity for
separate juvenile court to concern for social rehabilitation of wayward youths); see also Ainsworth, supra note 7,
at 1096-1101 (discussing the ideological underpinnings of the reforms that gave rise to the separate juvenile court
in the Progressive Era).
10. Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
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Part IV analyzes some of the key and relevant constitutional case law in the
post-Gault era to present a due process argument against shackling and to incorpo-
rate social science research into the legal and policy argument. The article applies
the research-based insights, combined with due process analysis derived from
Gault and other case law, to argue that the use of exceptional restraints must be
reserved for the rare case where the court makes an individualized determination
that unusual facts warrant such an extreme measure, and that requiring such indi-
vidualized determinations fosters positive behavioral and psychological outcomes
for the child, both of which are key goals of the juvenile court process in the pre-
and post-Gault eras.
Part V examines shackling through the perspective of "therapeutic jurispru-
dence," a field of social inquiry that studies the ways in which legal rules, proce-
dures, and the roles of legal actors produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic conse-
quences for those affected by the legal process. Therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to
promote policies, systems, and relationships that are consistent with normative
principles of justice and constitutional law, and will secure positive therapeutic
outcomes and minimize negative psychological and behavioral effects of anti-
therapeutic legal rules and practices." Therapeutic jurisprudence provides a par-
ticularly useful methodology for the fashioning of policy in the juvenile justice
system with its avowed goal of rehabilitation. As one scholar has observed: "Be-
cause the tools of therapeutic jurisprudence are borrowed largely from the psycho-
logical and other social science disciplines, it can inform and influence public pol-
icy within an established epistemological framework.'
' 2
The article concludes by arguing that public policy should promote the due
process rights and therapeutic interests of juveniles as they move through the juve-
nile justice system, while also being cognizant of legitimate public safety consid-
erations. The indiscriminate shackling of juveniles without individualized determi-
nations of public safety risk, subordinates to public safety concerns, the child's
right to be free from the government's arbitrary use of external restraint. In doing
so, it upsets a carefully modulated balance within the juvenile justice system,
which is intended
[t]o provide judicial and other procedures to assure due process
through which children and other parties are assured fair hearings
by a respectful and respected court ... the recognition, protection
and enforcement of their constitutional and other legal rights,
while ensuring that public safety interests and the authority and the
dignity of the courts are adequately protected.
3
The article urges Florida to adopt the National Juvenile Defender Center's recom-
mendation, the result of its recent assessment of access to counsel in Florida's ju-
11. See infra Part V.
12. A.J. Stephani, Symposium: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Children, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 13, 14 (2002).
13. FLA. STAT. § 985.01(1)(a) (2007).
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venile justice system, calling for a cessation of the practice of shackling children in
the juvenile courtroom:
State legislators, local policymakers, and juvenile court judges
should end the practice of shackling youth by hand, foot and belly
chain for court appearances unless an extenuating individual situa-
tion warrants such restraint. Under any circumstances, the practice
of shackling youth to each other in a group or to fixed objects in
the courtroom should be strictly prohibited.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SHACKLING AND ITS DISCONTENTS
I think the back of my feets [sic] can describe it, they hurt real bad.
They cut through your skin, they rip it and when you take them
off, you have a permanent dent in there of the shackles. They hurt;
you bleed a lot from them.
- Shackled Juvenile
15
Throughout Florida, juveniles in secure detention routinely appear before
judges wearing metal handcuffs, metal leg shackles, and sometimes belly chains
regardless of age, size, gender, or alleged offense.' 6 In Miami-Dade County's Ju-
venile Justice Center, girls and boys dressed in orange and brown jumpsuits are
held in a guarded holding area behind the courtrooms in ankle and wrist bracelets.
17
When children in Miami-Dade and other parts of the state enter the courtroom, they
are still held in restraints, frequently "chained to furniture, doors or other fixed
structures in the courtroom to keep them in place. ' 8 Photographs taken by the
Miami-Dade Public Defender's Office (posted on its web site) show the children
seated on benches in the waiting area and standing uncomfortably before the court
while bound by metal ankle and wrist restraints. The chains stay on for hours at a
14. NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, FLORIDA-AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL &
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 5 (2006), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida%20Assessment.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter FLORIDA-AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL]. See discussion infra Part ILD.2.
15. Voice Project, supra note 2 (Mar. 29, 2007) (on file with author).
16. FLORIDA-AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL, supra note 14, at 5, 57-58. See also Curt Ander-
son, Effort Growing to End Florida Shackling of Juvenile Suspects, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 18, 2006, available
at http://www.pdmiami.com/Effortgrowingto end Florida shackling.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007); Carlos
Martinez, Why are Children in Florida Treated as Enemy Combatants?, 29 NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION (NLADA) CORNERSTONE, May/Aug. 2007, at 10 (2007),
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/I1183059596.88/Cornerstone%2oMay-August%22007%/2o%232.pdf
(last visited Sept. 28, 2007) (summarizing history of juvenile shackling challenges in Florida).
17. See Motion for Child to Appear Free from Degrading and Unlawful Restraints, available at
http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren.htm/Motion-forChild_to _AppearFreefrom Degrading-andUni
awfulRestraints.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Motion for Child to Appear Free] ("The Department
of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) uses metal handcuffs to secure each child's wrists together. The child's legs are shackled
with metal leg-irons connected by an approximately sixteen inch chain. This short length of chain makes normal
walking impossible, and forces the child to shuffle." (citations omitted)).
18. FLORIDA-AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL, supra note 14, at 58.
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time, sometimes as long as a full day, and are not removed even when the children
need to use the bathroom.1 9 Many of the photographs show cuts, bruises and abra-
sions from the tight cuffs, which are fastened for hours on bare wrists and ankles.2°
Children interviewed about the practice complain that the restraints have
caused bleeding and other serious physical harms and discomforts.2 ' Even children
with special medical conditions, such as pregnancy, are not exempt from the prac-
tice.22 In several other counties, chained children are escorted through open areas
of the courthouse in public view, and then held in the courtroom in handcuffs and
leg irons for hours at a time. 23 Children as young as six are subject to these prac-
tices.24
A. Shackling as Metaphor for Power, Surveillance and Control
I feel trapped, I felt violated, like that I wouldn't be able to go
anywhere... I was being controlled.
-Shackled Juvenile
25
Just locked up man, powerless.
-Shackled Juvenile
26
Michel Foucault, in his seminal examination of the history of the modem
prison, Discipline and Punish, observed that the architectural features of the prison
were designed to create a "docile body" through "enclosure and the organization of
individuals in space." 27 In addition to rendering bodies docile, the spatial charac-
teristics of prisons made it easier for the state to observe inmates and to quickly
19. According to one of the children interviewed: "Yeah man, shit, you can be sitting there for four hours,
hours at a time, and then they call your name and then you have to wait for the next court, afternoon court, you
might sit there for [the whole day, with shackles on] ... Go to use the bathroom and you got shackles on, you
gotta do it as best way you can." Voice Project, supra note 2 (Mar. 30, 2007) (on file with author).
20. See Motion for Child to Appear Free, supra note 17 5-8.
21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22. Another juvenile interviewed reported that she had been shackled in court while pregnant. She also
reported on this harrowing experience when she was transported to a hospital facility in shackles while pregnant:
"Yeah, they shackled me when I was pregnant and then later when I was in the hospital when they told, you know,
the people that I didn't have to wear cuffs, the man said oh well, she already fell down, the supervisor cause he
told them to put shackles on me." Voice Project, supra note 2 (on file with author).
23. See Motion for Child to Appear Free, supra note 17 7 ("Thus chained, children await their court
hearings in the locked, staff-supervised holding area behind the courtrooms. The waiting time varies with the type
of proceeding, the length of the calendar, and the child's position on it. It is possible for a child to remain shackled
for as long as four hours while waiting.").
24. Bob Herbert, 6-Year-Olds Under Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at A19 ("'You can't handcuff them
on their wrists because their wrists are too small, so you have to handcuff them up to their biceps,"' quoting Avon
Park, Florida, Police Chief Frank Mercurio).
25. Voice Project, supra note 2 (on file with author).
26. Id.
27. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 198. See also Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault's Approach to Power: Its Allure
and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 395, 420-44 (discussing Foucault's approach to
power in different intellectual, institutional and historical contexts).
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intervene to correct wayward behaviors. Foucault saw the "progressive objectifica-
tion and the ever more subtle partitioning of individual behaviour"; the "innumer-
able petty mechanisms" of control and surveillance built into the penal spaces that
he examined.28 He also noted the nuanced spatial tactics that obscure their substan-
tial influence on the behavior of those subjugated by these forces and spaces: "The
disciplinary institutions secreted a machinery of control that functioned like a mi-
croscope of conduct; the fine, analytical divisions that they created formed around
men an apparatus of observation, recording and training."29
Shackling children in the juvenile courtroom is a paradigmatic example or
metaphor of the exercise of the machinery of power, surveillance, and control by
the state qua judge over the docile body of the allegedly disobedient and powerless
child.3°
B. Sources of the Power to Shackle Children
[T]he use of mechanical restraints is not an effort on the part of the
Department or the Court to inflict physical or mental anguish, or to
torture or humiliate detained youth. Rather, the practice, reserved
as it is for those who have already been screened as posing a risk
to public safety, serves to reduce the possibility that youths will
pick up additional charges at this early stage of juvenile proceed-
ings.
-Florida Department of Juvenile Justice
31
The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice's 32 statutorily-delegated authority
to use mechanical restraints is limited to the control of youth who present a threat
to safety and security within secure detention facilities operated by the agency, and
when it transports youth outside secure facilities and to court.3 3 DJJ has the author-
ity to place children in secure detention based on a risk assessment instrument ad-
ministered and scored by a juvenile probation officer at the time of the child's ar-
28. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 173.
29. Id.
30. It is also a case example of the broader power and dominion exercised by the apparatus of the state over
children who have far fewer legal and constitutional rights than adults by virtue of their legal incapacity as chil-
dren, and, therefore, see themselves as powerless to counter the overwhelming authority of the state and adults.
See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1315 (1995) (argu-
ing for an empowerment rights perspective to enable incapacitated children to overcome paternalistic control and
dominance); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing
and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1695 (1996) ("Because children are powerless, they
do not expect adults to treat them with respect or to listen to their opinions. They are treated as passive and subor-
dinate beings who must follow the instructions of an older and wiser adult.").
31. Department of Juvenile Justice's Response to Child's Motion to Appear Without Mechanical Restraints
at 4-5, (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2006) [hereinafter Response to Child's Motion] (on file with author).
32. [Hereinafter DJJ]
33. See infra Part IV.B and Part IV.C.
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rest.34 Youth who receive numerical scores above a certain level are presumed to
warrant detention.35 Although the use of screening instruments such as this are
seen by some juvenile detention reform advocates as objective methods to promote
alternatives to secure detention, the National Juvenile Defender Center criticizes
Florida's reliance on this instrument as "flawed".36 Risk assessment instruments,
such as the DJJ detention instrument, reflect what Professor Jonathan Simon de-
scribes as the "complex relationship between citizens, government, and risk" in
contemporary prison and correctional discourse, one "far more concerned with
setting risk-appropriate custody levels and removing at-risk parolees from the
community, than.., with rehabilitating offenders.,
37
After the DJJ risk assessment is completed, the court must hold a detention
hearing within twenty-four hours of a child being taken into custody and detained
by DJJ to decide whether a youth can be held in secure detention prior to adjudica-
tion.38 At the detention hearing, the court determines whether there is probable
cause that the child committed the delinquent act.39 If the court does not find that
probable cause exists, the court must release the child from detention.4 ° If the court
finds probable cause, it must base its decision to place a child in secure detention
on a detailed set of statutory criteria, including the information in the DJJ risk as-
34. FLA. STAT. § 985.245 (2007). See also S.W. v. Woolsey, 673 So. 2d 152, 154-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (discussing purposes and functions of risk assessment instrument). The agency's authority to detain a child
is "based in part on a prudent assessment of risk and ... limited to situations where there is clear and convincing
evidence that a child presents a risk of failing to appear or presents a substantial risk of inflicting bodily harm on
others as evidenced by recent behavior." FLA. STAT. § 985.02(4)(a) (2007); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 985.01(1)(c),
985.24(1), 985.25(l)(b)-(c), 985.255 (2007) (outlining procedures and criteria used in the DJJ assessment of risk at
detention intake).
DJJ also has the statutory authority to securely detain any child who "presents a history of committing a
serious property offense prior to adjudication, disposition, or placement; has acted in direct or indirect contempt of
court; or requests protection from imminent bodily harm." FLA. STAT. § 985.02(4)(a) (2007); see also FLA. STAT.
§ 985.24(1) (2007). The National Juvenile Defender Center report noted that children can be placed in secure
detention for technical probation and parole violations (such as violating curfew). See FLORIDA-AN ASSESSMENT
OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL, supra note 14, at 57.
These children and other children who are victims of abuse (i.e., those seeking placement in secure
detention as safe harbor from harm) are also chained in the courtroom even though their placement by the court in
secure detention is not based on a determination by DJJ or a finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence
that they present a substantial risk of inflicting bodily injury on others or of committing a property offense. FLA.
STAT. § 985.02(4)(a) (2007).
35. FLA. STAT. § 985.25(1)(b)-(c) (2007).
36. FLORIDA-AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL, supra note 14, at 38. As evidence of these flaws,
the Defender Center report points to the high percentage of children released by judges from secure detention
based on material errors in the scoring of the instrument by DJJ workers and mitigating factors not captured by the
risk assessment which are weighed by judges in departing from DJJ detention recommendations. Id. at 38-40.
The report also notes that the instrument has been criticized by judges and lawyers as not "scientifically validated
and... in serious need of revision." Id. at 38. See also Martinez, supra note 16, at 11 ("Florida uses a detention
risk assessment instrument that has never been scientifically validated to measure dangerousness or anything
else.").
37. Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America's Severity Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 217, 238-39 (2001).
38. FLA. STAT. § 985.255(3)(a) (2007); Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.010(b) (2007). Additionally, youth charged with
committing domestic violence may be put into secure detention, regardless of the risk assessment results, to pro-
tect the alleged victim from further injury. FLA. STAT. § 985.255(2) (2007).
39. FLA. STAT. § 985.255(3)(a) (2007).
40. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.010(g) (2007).
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sessment.4' The detention order must contain specific instructions regarding re-
lease of the child at the conclusion of the detention period.42 Moreover, the author-
ity to securely detain a child cannot exceed twenty-one days, unless "an adjudica-
tory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court.'A3 Thus,
the same child who appears in court in chains while in secure detention will appear
in court without shackles at all subsequent hearings if released from secure deten-
tion prior to adjudication on day twenty-one.
DJJ argues that the authority vested in it to make "initial determinations of of-
fender risk to the public" provides it with the authority to place mechanical re-
straints on securely detained juveniles within the courtroom. 44 In court filings, it
contends that the harms to public safety presented by all securely detained juve-
niles justify the blanket use of shackles in the courtroom. DJJ concludes that its
statutory authority to "ensure the protection of society by providing for a standard-
ized assessment of the child's needs so that the most appropriate control, discipline,
punishment, and treatment can be administered consistent with the seriousness of
the act committed,, 45 imbues the department with virtually unchecked authority to
ensure that "allphases of restraint and/or forms of detention are taken into account
within the assessment of risk process. '"46 Notwithstanding this broad claim of au-
thority over "all phases of restraint," DJJ concedes that it will unshackle an of-
fender in the courtroom if ordered by the court.47
Moreover, DJJ's claim that it possesses plenary authority to manage and con-
trol all phases of restraint as part of its risk assessment process accountability du-
ties fails to acknowledge the explicit limits imposed by the legislature, and by its
own administrative regulations, on its authority to restrain children. Although de-
tailed rules provide DJJ staff with carefully circumscribed authority to restrain
youth while held in detention facilities and when transporting youth outside secure
facilities,48 the statutes or rules are completely silent with respect to the agency's
41. FLA. STAT. § 985.255(1) (2007).
42. FLA. STAT. § 985.26(1) (2007).
43. FLA. STAT. § 985.26(2) (2007). The statute also provides that detention can be extended for "good
cause" for an additional nine days if the charged offense is classified as a felony. Id.
44. See Response to Child's Motion, supra note 31, at 3.
45. Id. at 2 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 985.01(l)(a) (undated), renumbered as FLA. STAT. § 985.01(1)(c)
(2007)).
46. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 5 (noting that "[w]hile... a blanket policy of unshackling securely detained youth in the court-
room will jeopardize public safety, if the Court determines on a case-by-case basis that a particular youth should
be unshackled in court, the Department will comply with that Order.").
48. See FLA. STAT. § 985.03(44)(c)-(e) (2007) (authorizing use of mechanical restraints in moderate-risk,
high-risk, and maximum-risk residential programs "when necessary"); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 63G-2.005(2)3
(noting use of mechanical restraints, i.e., handcuffs, restraint belts, leg cuffs, soft restraints, as "security devices"
in DJJ detention centers); R. 63G-2.005(6) (d) (noting permissible use "if necessary" of mechanical restraints in
detention centers "[w]hen youth are noncompliant or present a danger to self or others"); R. 63G-2.012(3)(a)-(d)
(noting limited use of mechanical restraints as a method of controlling youth who present a threat to safety and
security within detention facility and when transporting youth outside secure area of facility, but forbidding use of
mechanical restraints as a means of discipline and requiring report submitted for review when mechanical re-
straints are used); R. 63H-1.002 (detailing curricular requirements for staff training in detention facilities for use of
mechanical restraints); R. 63H-1.003 (authorizing use of mechanical restraints as a "Level 3" response where a
youth has initiated "active, combative, or aggravated resistance," and in situations where a youth poses a physical
threat to self or others); R. 63H-1.004 (describing techniques for use of mechanical restraints); R. 63H-1.005
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authority to use mechanical restraints inside the courthouse and courtroom. In-
deed, the agency's statutory authority to restrain children ends at the courthouse
door. Unlike the detailed policies that govern use of restraints inside DJJ facilities
and when transporting children outside of those facilities, there are no written poli-
cies pertaining to the use of restraints in the courtroom.
49
DJJ defends the use of chains and handcuffs as necessary for public safety, and
rejects criticism that their use is indiscriminate. ° A spokesperson argues: "Our
agency is responsible for ensuring the safety and well-being of the public. Some
youth in our care are accused of serious crimes, such as murder and armed rob-
bery." 5' In court filings, DJJ states that the use of shackles "is not an effort ... to
inflict physical or mental anguish, or to torture or humiliate detained youth," but
intended to prevent youth from escaping or getting into further trouble.5 2 "All in
the courtroom should share the common goal of seeing that youth do not become
more deeply involved in the juvenile justice system.,
53
On the question of whether to permit shackles to be removed, the agency says
it defers to judges. However, judges typically do not question the presumption that
all children are to be shackled, and instead defer to the judgment of law enforce-
ment agencies and the asserted authority of DJJ regarding the need to use shackles
in order to satisfy their concerns about courtroom safety.54 Any countervailing
concerns about the legality of the practice, or its effects on the children who are
placed in shackles, are raised by judges (if at all) on a discretionary ad hoc basis-
sometimes exercised in a principled and thoughtful manner, other times capri-
ciously and arbitrarily.55
The lack of a uniform statewide standard comporting with the requirements of
constitutional due process results in dramatically different opinions, rulings, and
policies about the use of shackles by courts throughout the state. By way of illus-
tration, the first juvenile court judge in Miami-Dade County to grant a motion to
unshackle a detained child stated that he would always permit the unshackling of
(describing authorized use of mechanical restraints (handcuffs, leg restraints, restraint belts, soft restraints, and
waist chains) within DJJ facilities); R. 63H-1.006 (describing staff supervision of youth placed in mechanical
restraints). R. 63H-1.009 (describing certification for training in use of restraints); R. 63H-1.012 (describing in-
service training requirements on use of mechanical restraints); R. 63H-1.013 (describing restraint testing require-
ments); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R 10Q-5.015 (2007) (describing use of mechanical restraints in boot camps);
Fla. Dept. of Juv. Justice Office of Probation & Community Corrections Probation & Community Corrections
Handbook (2006) (inter alia prohibiting use of physical restraints by probation officers when transporting youths;
prohibiting use of handcuffs and/or shackles in the airport; requiring use of approved mechanical restraints when
transporting youth from detention facilities or assessment centers to court).
49. See infra Part 1V.B and Part 1V.C.
50. Anderson, supra note 16.
51. Id. (quoting DJJ spokesperson Cynthia Lorenzo in an e-mail to Associated Press reporter).
52. Id. (quoting Brian Berkowitz, Chief Assistant General Counsel of the Department of Juvenile Justice).
53. Id.
54. See infra Part II.C. See also Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 373 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (holding that a juvenile delinquency court abused its discretion in justifying the shackling ofjuveniles solely
on the inadequacy of courtroom facilities or the lack of available security personnel) (see discussion infra Part
II.E.2).
55. Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 369-70 (describing the juvenile court's exercise of discretion in denying
a petition to unshackle as an example of "arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking").
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children on motion of the public defender as long as a bailiff was present in the
courtroom to ensure the safety of the proceedings:
This has always been my ruling in my courtroom. I have always
said that they shall not be chained in this courtroom. I don't think
it is an administrative position. I feel each judge has the right to
call it as he sees it, but I have always disagreed with the policy of
chaining the children. That has always been my position.
56
In contrast to the Miami-Dade judge's favorable ruling on the motion, a juve-
nile court judge in upstate Sumter County responded with indignation and outright
contempt to a request by a public defender to unshackle his client before the start
of an adjudicatory hearing in his courtroom. The judge denied the public de-
fender's request with a lengthy speech about the threats to courthouse security that
unshackling would unleash:
Is there any legal reason [to unshackle]? I mean, has it been that
we would set aside twenty, thirty years of procedure in the court-
room on this particular case ... [I]n light of the violence that is
generally coming out of the people who tend to commit crimes and
are involved in the court system...
... I would be [remiss] in my duties at this point, to start releasing
people and let them walk freely around in the courthouse in light
of everything that is going on. I mean, people can say, well, that's
just the media and they don't-well, these people are dead. These
people are dead from unshackling people who are in custody.
And I'm just in shock that we're in light of-and I know there are
newspaper articles coming out now that are saying this is inhuman
that we shackle people. It is the unshackled people that are killing
people in the courtroom. It is the unshackled-in-custody people
that are committing heinous crimes of unbelievable [proportions].
Yet out of South Florida we have people that say this is inhuman
to treat people in this manner. So I am going to deny that request
56. Transcript of Hearing at 7, State of Florida v. J.A., Case No. [redacted], (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2006) (on file
with author). This ore tenus decision was rendered the same day that the shackling litigation commenced, and it
prompted the other three delinquency court judges in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit to follow suit, which in effect
led to the de facto, voluntary cessation of the blanket shackling policy in the circuit. (E-mail from Carlos J. Marti-
nez, Chief Assistant Public Defender, Office of Public Defender (Miami-Dade), to Bernard P. Perlmutter, Assis-
tant Professor of Clinical Legal Education, University of Miami School of Law (July 1, 2007, 02:52 p.m. (EST))
(on file with author).
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because I think there is a safety factor to all people that are sitting
in here.57
These two rulings on motions to unshackle reflect the range of dramatically
varying opinions among judges about the practice. They demonstrate why it is
necessary to establish, through legislation, administrative or court rule, or judicial
precedent, a uniform standard applicable in all courtrooms throughout the state.
The standard should be one that comports with the requirements of substantive and
procedural due process, ensures the state bears the burden of showing that the child
is dangerous or at risk of running away, and mandates that the court make indi-
vidualized findings based on the evidence presented before it can grant the state
permission to impose such a severe restriction on the child's physical liberty. 8
C. Origins of the Practice of Shackling Children in Court
My God, it would be extremely dangerous [to remove restraints]
... If just one kid is off, it could ignite the whole group. He could
get a gun from a deputy. With the facilities we have and the lack
of funding, it's a security issue.
-Maura Smith, Chief Administrative Circuit Court Judge in Orange and Os-
ceola Counties59
Shackling children in juvenile court proceedings appears to have been intro-
duced at different times in different parts of the state, but for one reason-
courtroom safety. 60 Published media reports of incidents of violence, 61 courtroom
shootings, and rising anxiety about public facility safety in the post-9/11 era, have
undoubtedly prompted courts and law enforcement agencies to institute courthouse
safety and security precautions. 62 Like "zero-tolerance" and other emergency
57. Transcript of Hearing at 3-6, State of Florida v. [Child], No. 2006-CJ-[redacted], (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2006)
(unpaginated document) (on file with author).
58. See discussion infra Part IV. See also Dep't.of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957, 967
(Fla. 1991) ("[W]hen an individual is charged with a crime, the government cannot deprive that person of life,
liberty, or property unless [the government] carries the burden of proof beyond every reasonable doubt as to each
essential element.").
59. Maya Bell, Public Defenders in Miami-Dade Call for Unshackling of Kids in Courtroom, SUN-
SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2006, at lB.
60. See Martinez, supra note 16, at 10-11. The Miami-Dade Public Defender's Office surveyed defender
offices in Florida and found that in some counties children had been shackled for over two decades, while in others
the practice is less than five years old.
61. See, e.g., Matthew Brown, Judges Get Lesson in Protection; Gretna Police Sponsor Security Work-
shop, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 3, 2005, at I (Metro); Rhonda Cook, Court Melee Renews Fear Over
Security; Chief Judge's Report Says Warnings Were Ignored, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, June 9, 2006, at
IE; Deborah Sontag, In Courts, Threats Become Alarming Fact of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at Al.
62. See, e.g., News Release, National Center for State Courts, Improving Security in State Courthouses:
Ten Essential Elements for Court Safety (Mar. 16, 2005), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/ (last visited
Sept. 28, 2007); NAT'L ASSN. FOR CT. MANAGEMENT, COURT SECURITY GUIDE (offering checklist of recom-
mended courtroom security measures, including "a policy on the type of restraints that can be used, when and
where restraints may be placed and removed, and emergency guidelines").
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measures enacted by school districts in response to student shootings,63 shackling
children in court is a reaction to threats (or perceived threats) of violence.64 In sev-
eral states, judges have even resorted to self-help measures such as arming them-
selves for protection in the courtroom.65  While judges and law enforcement per-
sonnel repeatedly cite the need to maintain order and decorum in the courtroom as
a central justification for shackling children,66 data on the incidence of courtroom
violence, and particularly violence perpetrated by juveniles, is sparse and not sup-
portive of a blanket shackling policy.
67
D. Challenges to Shackling Children in Florida Courts
Shackling children is an affront to our principles of justice. It
makes a mockery of the presumption of innocence doctrine, inter-
feres with the right to freely think and express yourself in your
own defense, demeans the dignity of an American courtroom, and
runs counter to the rehabilitative nature inherent in juvenile court.
Adult clients accused of the most serious crimes are not shackled
absent evident danger.
-Marie Osborne, Chief, Juvenile Division, Miami-Dade Public Defender
68
1. Duval County Litigation
The earliest reported case to address the use of shackles on juveniles in Flor-
ida's court system was filed in 1990 in the Fourth Judicial Circuit (Duval County).
Two judges had instituted a "general policy" requiring all children held in secure
detention to be shackled during all court appearances. 69 Under their policy, indi-
63. See, e.g., Christina Curtis, Note, Responding to Columbine: Kent School District and the Use of Hand-
cuffs, 28 WHITTIER L. Rrv. 793 (2006). Notably, however, there has not been a single report of a courthouse
shooting by a juvenile, much less one of Columbine-like proportions. See infra note 67, and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, Terror in Atlanta: Security; Budget Can Affect Safety Inside Many Court-
houses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, at AI I ("'There's a general perception among judges that there are more
threats,' said Judge Lawrence L. Piersol of Federal District Court in Sioux Falls, S.D., president of the Federal
Judges Association. 'Many judges feel this way. Once this is analyzed, there may be some different security
procedures initialized."').
65. See, e.g., Amanda Bronstad, More Judges Packing Pistols in Courtrooms: Despite More Security,
States Pass Laws Allowing Jurists to Arm Themselves, NATIONAL L. J., Dec. 7, 2006 ("'Judges in our courthouse
have been carrying guns almost all the time,' said Cynthia Stevens Kent, a Texas judge in the 114th District Court,
where a man in a family law case killed his ex-wife and son last year on the steps of a Tyler courthouse.").
66. See, e.g., S.Y. v. McMillan, 563 So. 2d 807, 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1990) ("A court has the inherent
power to control the conduct of its own proceedings in order to preserve order and decorum in the courtroom, to
protect the rights of parties and witnesses, and to generally further the administration ofjustice.").
67. See [Hon.] Fred A. Geiger, Courthouse Violence: The View from the Bench, 576 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 102, 103 ("Because of the lack of hard data, security planners may be forced to base their deci-
sions on anecdotal reports of risk. Unfortunately, these reports are often inaccurate and many times are totally
wrong."). See also Moore, supra note 6 ("There are no national figures for violent incidents in juvenile court-
rooms.").
68. Memorandum Re: Shackling Children in Court, from Marie Osbome, Chief, Juvenile Division, Public
Defender's Office, to Honorable Lester Langer 2 (May 17, 2006) (on file with author).
69. S.Y., 563 So. 2d at 807-808.
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vidual hearings to determine if shackling was necessary to prevent escape or dis-
ruptive behavior were disallowed.70 The public defender filed six motions on be-
half of shackled juveniles. The two judges, sitting en banc, consolidated the mo-
tions and treated them as a class action. They entered a single order denying the
motions. The juveniles filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
In reviewing the challenged order, the First District Court of Appeal treated the
petition as a writ of certiorari and denied the relief requested. Overlooking proce-
dural defects in the order,7' the court held that the juveniles had failed to show a
departure from the essential requirements of law that could not be remedied on
direct appeal. The decision ignored the fact that only an adjudicated juvenile could
challenge the use of shackles on direct appeal, and that a juvenile subsequently
acquitted or nolle prossed would have no remedy, direct or collateral, to challenge
the use of shackles.
In denying the petition, the district court noted that all of the petitioners' sup-
porting legal authority involved direct appeals or collateral attacks by adult defen-
dants from convictions by juries.72 Because juvenile proceedings are conducted
before the circuit court without a jury, the court reasoned that "the 7prejudicial ef-
fect of the shackling of a defendant in front of a jury" was absent.7 The court's
cramped view of the prejudicial effect on the juvenile of being shackled is particu-
larly striking. It ignored the prejudice to the juvenile's ability to communicate ef-
fectively with counsel, to the presumption of innocence, to the intimate and infor-
mal tenor of juvenile court proceedings, and to the inherent dignity of the child
when held in shackles in the courtroom.74
The second reason given for denying the petition was the "positive effect [of
shackling] on security and decorum in the courtroom., 75 Based on a trial court
record that apparently consisted of uncontroverted and anecdotal testimony from a
bailiff that the policy had decreased "fights among the juveniles and escape at-
tempts, 76 the appeals court deemed this evidence a sufficient factual reason to
deny the petition, and thus, in effect, upheld the lower court's shackling policy.
77
Even though the decision was procedurally limited by the extremely deferential
nature of certiorari review,78 it reflects three disturbing assumptions: First, a lim-
70. Id. at 808.
71. Id. The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure and the Circuit Court's administrative rules disallowed the
judges' treatment of the motions as a class action, conducting a single en banc hearing, and entry of a single order.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion) (noting that imposing
a constitutional requirement for jury trials in juvenile court proceedings might put an end to "the idealistic prospect
of an intimate, informal protective proceeding," and lead to a diminution of the "aspect of fairness, of concern, of
sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates"). See discussion infra Part III.A.
75. S.Y, 563 So. 2d at 809.
76. Id.
77. Id. The decision contains no discussion of any testimony by the petitioners or expert witnesses con-
cerning the prejudicial impact on the children affected by the court's blanket shackling policy.
78. Id. Because of the limited scope of certiorari review, the court did not reach or address any due process
claims made by the petitioner. However, the merits of the petitioners' claims would today be significantly
strengthened by the U.S. Supreme Court's recent holding that shackling adult criminal defendants at the penalty
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ited understanding of the prejudicial impact of shackling on children; second, a
prevailing social fear of uncontrolled juvenile violence; and third, a concern with
courtroom security at all costs as an overreaction to publicized incidents of court-
room violence, even though the evidence of courtroom violence perpetrated by
juveniles is exceedingly sparse.
2. Miami-Dade County Litigation
The most recent Florida efforts to challenge courtroom shackling, launched in
Miami-Dade County,79 were prompted by long-standing concerns about this prac-
tice and by the National Juvenile Defender Center's findings in its 2006 report, An
Assessment of Access to Counsel & Quality of Representation in Delinquency Pro-
ceedings. The Defender Center's report surveyed and observed court proceedings
and identified numerous endemic problems, such as high rates of waiver of coun-
sel, lack of zealous defense advocacy, hectic courtrooms, and inadequate defense
resources.
One of the report's more disconcerting findings was the "frequent and liberal
use of restraints on youth in Florida courtrooms. 8 ° Courtroom observers found the
use of wrist and leg shackles with belly chains to be the "norm" in many juvenile
courtrooms across the state, frequently used to restrain nonviolent offenders held in
secure detention on parole or probation violations. 8' Every courtroom visited by
the observers had youth, including very young children, "fully shackled when they
were brought from detention into the courthouse itself." 82 In most cases, children
were shackled together in groups. The observers saw "youth who were brought
into courtrooms in wrist and leg shackles and then were further chained to furni-
ture, doors or other fixed structures in the courtroom to keep them in place. 83 The
report noted:
While there may be legitimate reasons for securing a specific
youth in this extreme fashion, observers heard no justification for
this practice of shackling every single detained youth for court. As
explained above, many youth detained in Florida are being held
based on technical violations of probation or parole, such as failing
to meet curfew.84
stage of a capital trial without individualized findings of dangerousness or risk, violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Deck, 544 U.S. at 622. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
79. See William R. Levesque & Curtis Krueger, Is it a Chain Overreaction? Dangerous Adults Stand
Unfettered Before Pinellas Judges, While Children are Routinely Shackled Some are Asking Why, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 22, 2004, at IB (reporting on an unsuccessful effort by Pinellas-Pasco Public Defender
Bob Dillinger in 2004 to persuade judges to remove chains from children appearing in Pinellas County Juvenile
Court).
80. FLORIDA-AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL, supra note 14, at 57.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 58.
84. Id. at 57.
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Perhaps the most disconcerting finding was that this widespread practice fre-
quently went unchallenged by public defenders. In those circuits where children's
attorneys were more zealous in challenging the practices, many judges refused to
alter existing practices by making individual determinations of the need to shackle.
As a result, public defenders were unable to challenge or change the status quo, and
the judges were content to continue the unquestioned use of shackles to control
children in their courtrooms:
[N]owhere in the state did observers see juvenile defenders openly
challenging this dehumanizing practice [of shackling their clients].
It was reported that in counties where this practice has been chal-
lenged, the judges have refused to establish the more reasonable
practice of shackling the individual child when there is a specific
reason to do so.
85
The Miami-Dade challenge to the practice began in May 2006 with a memo-
randum sent by the Public Defender's Office to the Associate Administrative Judge
for the Juvenile Division of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The memorandum was
prepared in anticipation of the release of the Defender Center report, with its criti-
cism of widespread public defender diffidence and judicial acquiescence toward
shackling, and to redress long-standing objections to the practice.8 6 The memoran-
dum crystallized the practical and policy arguments against the practice in the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit's courtrooms:
Now we have weapons detectors and security guards stationed at
the only two entrances/exits to the Juvenile Justice Center. We
have Miami Dade police officers permanently stationed within
yards of the courtrooms. We have courtroom bailiffs, walkie talk-
ies, judicial buzzer alarms and electronic gates capable of closing
on a moment's notice ....
Despite all this increased hardware and security personnel, and
with no increased danger or need, DJJ's policy of shackling chil-
dren while in transport has been extended to shackling children pe-
riod.
Shackling children is an affront to our principles of justice. It
makes a mockery of the presumption of innocence doctrine, inter-
feres with the right to freely think and express yourself in your
own defense, demeans the dignity of an American courtroom and
runs counter to the rehabilitative nature inherent in juvenile court.
85. Id.
86. Telephone interview with Marie Osborne, Chief of the Miami-Dade Office of Public Defender, Juve-
nile Division, in Miami, Fla. (June 21, 2007).
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Adult clients accused of the most serious crimes are not shackled
absent evident danger.87
Weeks later, at the instigation of the public defender, the Associate Adminis-
trative Judge convened a series of meetings with the four juvenile court judges, the
Miami-Dade Public Defender's Office, the State Attorney's Office, and representa-
tives from DJJ. On June 21, 2006, in response to the public defender memoran-
dum, the judges of the Juvenile Division agreed to remove handcuffs and shackles
88during adjudicatory hearings. However, the discussions failed to effectuate any
additional or more fundamental systemic alterations to the court's blanket shack-
ling policy at detention hearings, dispositional hearings, or other proceedings in the
court."
Because they were unable to convince the judges to agree to more sweeping
changes to existing policy, on September 11, 2006, the public defenders initiated a
strategy of challenging each instance of shackling through the filing of motions in
all juvenile courtrooms. The Office prepared a Motion for Child to Appear Free
from Degrading and Unlawful Restraints.9" Over one hundred individual motions
to unchain detained children were filed. The motion's core constitutional and legal
arguments were summarized as follows:
The degrading practice of bringing children before the Court in
chains is unlawful and must cease. The use of exceptional restraint
measures without an individualized showing of necessity is con-
trary to chapter 985 [Florida Statutes] and the very purposes of the
juvenile justice system. The practice violates children's right to
due process and interferes with the right to counsel and to partici-
pate in the defense of the case, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments and article I, sections 9 and 16 of the
Florida Constitution. The Court's practice also stands in clear vio-
lation of international law. Just as importantly, the handcuffing
and shackling of children can cause them serious mental and emo-
tional harm, and undermine the Court's very objectives in prevent-
ing delinquency or rehabilitating a child.91
The motion argued that the statutory and constitutional rights derive from the
ancient right under common law to "be brought to the bar without irons, or any
manner of shackles or bonds; unless there be evident danger of an escape." 92 It
emphasized the need to maintain "[t]he courtroom's formal dignity, which includes
87. Memorandum Re: Shackling Children, supra note 68 (emphasis in original). See also Martinez, supra
note 16, at 10, 15 (describing history of advocacy efforts in Miami-Dade).




92. Id. 40 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 317 (1769)); see
Deck, 544 U.S. at 622 (shackling in penalty phase of capital trial violates due process).
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the respectful treatment of defendants." 93 Consequently, the motion argued that the
use of shackles is only permissible where justified by "an essential state interest
specific to each trial.' The key argument was that, except in rare circumstances,
the detriments to children of the practice, both legal and non-legal, outweigh the
state's interest in restraining children to maintain courtroom security.95
The motion detailed the personal harms (emotional, psychological and medi-
cal) that children suffer when held in restraints. Relying on expert affidavits in
therapeutic jurisprudence, adolescent development, and childhood trauma, the mo-
tion documented the practice as counter-therapeutic, psychologically and physi-
cally harmful, contrary to basic tenets of developmental pediatric practice, and
tantamount to child abuse.96 The psychological and medical affidavits elaborated
on the harms that detained children suffer when placed in restraints. 97 Dr. Marty
Beyer, a national consultant on juvenile justice issues,98 opined that "[b]eing shack-
led in public is humiliating for young people, whose sense of identity is vulnerable.
The young person who feels he/she is being treated like a dangerous animal will
think less of him/herself. Children and adolescents are more vulnerable to lasting
harm from feeling humiliation and shame than adults."99 Dr. Beyer, whose area of
expertise is the interplay between adolescent development, trauma, and disability,
described how the indiscriminate and routine shackling of children in court, before
family and strangers, is damaging to the child's fragile sense of identity; how being
chained like a "dangerous animal" may cause the child to feel like one; and how
93. Motion for Child to Appear Free, supra note 17 40 (quoting Deck, 544 U.S. at 630-31).
94. Motion for Child to Appear Free, supra note 17 41 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69
(1986)).
95. Motion for Child to Appear Free, supra note 17 60.
96. Id. M 17-27, 60-64. The affidavits were submitted by University of Miami Law Professors Bruce J.
Winick and Bernard P. Perlmutter (therapeutic jurisprudence); Dr. Marty Beyer (clinical psychology); and Univer-
sity of Miami Miller School of Medicine Dr. Gwen Wurm (pediatric medicine). The Winick/Perlmutter therapeu-
tic jurisprudence affidavit, discussed infra Part V, complemented and elaborated on many of the points in the
Beyer and Wurm affidavits. A fourth affidavit, beyond the scope of this article (prepared by University of Miami
Law Professor Stephen J. Schnably), addressed the international human rights implications of the practice.
97. The Department of Juvenile Justice, in a memorandum prepared in response to the Motion for Child to
Appear Free from Degrading and Unlawful Restraints, argued that use of mechanical restraints was a "public
safety" precautionary measure not intended to inflict harm on juveniles or to torture them. It also contended that
the Public Defender's "plea for therapeutic jurisprudence" was a policy argument more appropriate for legislative
consideration than for a judicial proceeding:
Notwithstanding the Public Defender's plea for 'therapeutic jurisprudence,' which appeal
should more appropriately be made to the legislature, the use of mechanical restraints is not
an effort on the part of the Department or the Court to inflict physical or mental anguish, or
to torture or humiliate detained youth. Rather, the practice, reserved as it is for those who
have already been screened as posing a risk to public safety, serves to reduce the possibility
that youths will pick up additional charges at this early stage of juvenile proceedings.
See Response to Child's Motion, supra note 31 at 4-5. With respect to DJJ's comment about "therapeutic juris-
prudence," see infra note 295, and accompanying text.
98. Affidavit of Dr. Marty Beyer 2, available at http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren.htm.
(Appendix D) (last visited Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Beyer Affidavit].
99. Id. 10.
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the practice is especially severe to children of color, who may associate the practice
with racism, even if the practice is universal. 00
In addition, Dr. Beyer posited that the practice could undermine a child's will-
ingness to trust adults in positions of authority and the legal system, could damage
the child's moral identity and development, and could undermine the rehabilitative
goals of court intervention.' 0 Additionally, she expressed concern about the trau-
matic impact of shackling children who have been previously traumatized by
physical and sexual abuse, loss, neglect, and abandonment. Dr. Beyer also noted
that these children suffer from depression, attention and conduct disorders, and
substance abuse. 10 2 Furthermore, she observed that shackling exacerbates trauma,
reviving feelings of powerlessness, betrayal and self-blame. 0 3 Finally, she added
that shackling a victim of physical or sexual abuse, where restraint was part of the
abuse, could trigger flashbacks and reinforce early feelings of powerlessness.'
4
Dr. Gwen Wurm, a board-certified developmental-behavioral and general pe-
diatrician, clinical faculty member at the University of Miami Miller School of
Medicine, and medical director of the Jackson Memorial Hospital Medical Foster
Care Program, 0 5 opined that the policy of subjecting all children and adolescents
in the juvenile system to shackling without regard to their age, gender, mental
health history, history of violence, or risk of runaway, "goes against the basic ten-
ets of developmental pediatric practice."' 1 6 She added that "[a]ll children are not
the same based on their age, history, life experience, [or] mental health challenges.
In working with children/adolescents, policies need to be individualized in order
[to] achieve the best possible outcomes."'1 7 Utilizing "least restrictive settings" to
fashion policy for juveniles is consistent with that tenet and, because of the "iden-
tity formation" issues, is critical to the children's well-being.108  Being shackled
conveys that others see the child as "a contained beast," an image that "becomes
integrated in his own identity formation, possibly influencing his behavior and re-
sponses in the future."'09
100. Id. 9-13. See discussion infra Part 1V.E. Several juveniles interviewed through the Voice Project
compared their treatment to animals and one likened the experience of being shackled to a "choke hold" placed on
an animal (on file with author).
101. Id. 14-17.
102. Id. 18-19. As with the other opinions set forth in the Beyer affidavit, this statement was supported
by a substantial body of clinical research literature, a significant portion of it authored by Dr. Beyer. See, e.g.,
Marty Beyer, Ph.D., Fifty Delinquents in Juvenile and Adult Court, 76 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 206 (2006);
Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of] 7 Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 26 (2000);
Marty Beyer, What's Behind Behavior Matters: The Effects of Disabilities, Trauma and Immaturity on Juvenile
Intent and Ability to Assist Counsel, 58 GUILD PRAC. 112 (2001); Linda Teplin, et al. Psychiatric Disorders of
Youth in Detention, JUV. JUST. BULL., U.S. Dept. of Juvenile Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (Apr. 2006) (noting that nearly two-thirds of detained males and three-quarters of females in one study
met diagnostic criteria for one or more psychiatric disorders). See also discussion infra Part IV.E.
103. Beyer Affidavit, supra note 98, IN 18-19.
104. Id. See discussion infra note 287, and accompanying text.
105. Affidavit of Dr. Gwen Wurm, 1-3 available at http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren.htm.
(Appendix F) (last visited Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Wurm Affidavit].
106. Id. 17.
107. Id.




Finally, like Dr. Beyer, Dr. Wurm warned that shackling can cause emotional,
mental, and physical harm." 0 She opined that shackling could exacerbate symp-
toms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety disorder,
attention deficit disorder, conduct disorder, and interfere with the child's receptiv-
ity to rehabilitation."' She also observed that children "with previous nerve or
vessel damage" to an extremity are vulnerable to re-injury.1 2 She concluded that,
given the damage to children from shackling them hand and foot, a parent or
guardian who resorted to this method of restraint might be committing abuse under
Florida's child abuse statutes.'13
The motion requested an evidentiary hearing to allow the courts to hear testi-
mony from the affiants and other witnesses."4 The use of medical and psycho-
logical as well as therapeutic jurisprudence experts' opinions to bolster legal argu-
ments was a deliberate strategy, reflecting a conscious acknowledgment of the
medical (i.e., rehabilitative) purposes of the early juvenile court." 5  Indeed, the
motions relied on these expert opinions because contemporary juvenile justice pol-
icy and jurisprudence continue to be informed by this large body of research.
16
The litigation thus sought to use this testimony as a way to remedy a practice seen
as anathema to the rehabilitative and treatment objectives of the juvenile court.'
1 7
The judges declined to hear from any experts and offered several reasons for
refusing to hear the testimony. After several days of hearings, one judge referred to
the medical, psychological, and therapeutic jurisprudence expert opinions as "self-





114. Motion for Child to Appear Free, supra note 17, 80.
115. Early juvenile court discourse was dominated by analogies to delinquency as a medical illness and the
juvenile court as a hospice for the treatment of the pathologies associated with delinquency. See Ainsworth, supra
note 7, at 1096-1101. See also Charles J. Hoffman, The Fundamental Principles of the Juvenile Court and Its Part
in Future Community Programs for Child Welfare, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON JUVENILE-COURT
STANDARDS 13, 23 (1922) (describing delinquency as "a disease showing and destroying the lives of more chil-
dren than any other disease known to man."); Edward Schoen, The Field of the Juvenile Court, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CONFERENCE ON JUVENILE-COURT STANDARDS 32, 35 (1922) (describing the juvenile court as "a social
agency... for the adjustment of such social ills ... as are disclosed by an act or by repeated acts of minors whose
conduct gives us the objective symptoms of unwholesome social conditions"); Miriam Van Waters, The Socializa-
tion of Juvenile Court Procedure, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON JUVENILE COURT STANDARDS 64, 66
(1922) (likening juvenile court judges to physicians).
Medical analogies were embedded in the functioning of the juvenile court decades after its inception.
See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 3 (1967) ("[D]elinquency was thought of almost as a dis-
ease, to be diagnosed by specialists and the patient kindly but firmly dosed.").
116. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 542 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (relying on psychological and neurological
studies of adolescents to declare imposition of death penalty for juvenile offenders unconstitutional under Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause); Laurence Steinberg and Robert Schwartz, Developmental
Psychology Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL-A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 7
(Thomas Grisso and Robert Schwartz eds., 2000) (noting the importance of integrating adolescent development
perspectives into moral, legal, political, and practical analyses ofjuvenile crime).
117. Motion for Child to Appear Free, supra note 17, 28-39.
Fall 2007
Barry Law Review
no scientific underpinnings to their opinions."" 8 The judge also speculated, with-
out positing a scientific basis for his opinion, that the practice of shackling could
actually have a beneficial effect on the child's prospects for rehabilitation, and a
deterrent effect on a child with a prior history of juvenile court involvement:
Perhaps this short period of loss of liberty, relative to this short pe-
riod of shackling, which has been extended, will have a positive
impact, and send the message that this Court takes seriously, and
that this young man needs to take what the Court previously or-
dered seriously, and perhaps it will be a benefit to his rehabilitation
as opposed to a detriment. I think that argument is equally as
strong, counsel at this point in time." 9
This statement is revealing for its deliberate refusal to consider the experts'
opinions or to take into account any research supporting those opinions. It illus-
trates the extent of the courts' resistance to hear from experts (or the children them-
selves) about the harms inflicted on the children by the challenged practices.
120
Despite their reluctance to hear expert testimony concerning physical and psy-
chological harms suffered by children placed in restraints, the juvenile court judges
scheduled hearings on the daily "sounding" (arraignment) calendar on the motions
to remove shackles. Three days after the filing of the first motion, the Associate
Administrative Judge circulated a memorandum to the other judges advising them
to use the DJJ risk assessment instrument as a "general guideline" for "determining
risk and protecting the safety and security of the community, the Respondent
[child] and other Personnel in the Courtroom."' 12' The judges were asked to con-
sider the charges against the children and to weigh any "evidence of mitigation or
error" in scoring the risk assessment presented by the public defender.
22
Significantly, the Administrative Judge's memorandum placed the burden on
the child to petition for removal of the shackles and to present mitigating evidence
showing why restraints were unnecessary. Rather than placing the burden on the
118. Transcript of Hearing at 9, Florida v. F.P. No. [redacted] (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2006) (on file with author)
(emphasis added).
119. Id. at 14-15.
120. In Palm Beach County, the public defender filed a similar motion in October 2006, relying on the same
affidavits. See discussion infra Part I.D.3. The West Palm Beach judges' reactions to the expert affidavits were
similar to the skepticism expressed by the Miami-Dade judge. Although the judges took judicial notice of the
affidavits, they gave them no weight and refused to hear testimony from any of the affiants:
The motion is supported by a variety of affidavits alleging theories of harm to the juveniles
subjected to the courtroom security measures in question. However, not one child who is or
has been subjected to those security measures was ever evaluated or even interviewed by the
affiants in order to confirm the application of their theories to case specific facts.
Order Denying Motion to Appear Free of All Mechanical Restraints at All Judicial Proceedings at 2, R.C. v. Juve-
nile Court Judges of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Case No. 2006CJ4506 (Feb. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Order Deny-
ing Motion] (on file with author).
121. Memorandum from Judge Lester Langer Re: Shackling of Children in the Courtroom to Delinquency




state to demonstrate the necessity of restraining the child based on an individual-
ized assessment of dangerousness to, or risk of absconding, the memorandum in-
structed the judges to require each child to show cause for removal of shackles:
"The Court while balancing the rights of the Respondent together with the safety of
the community and the security of the Courtroom, has the full discretion to deter-
mine whether the shackle should remain on or be removed on a case by case basis
after a showing by the defense."'
23
Several weeks of individual hearings, involving hundreds of children, ce-
mented the end to the routine shackling of children in court proceedings in Miami-
Dade County. As of early July 2007, there have been no reported incidents of vio-
lence or absconding since cessation of the practice.' 24 To date, however, no court
in Miami-Dade County has issued a written court order stating a legal rationale or a
factual basis for the removal of shackles.
Because the courts have not rendered any binding, written decisions regarding
the legality of the practice, or given written, factual reasons for agreeing to un-
shackle individual children, it remains possible that one episode of violence or one
runaway incident could spark a resumption of shackling as a blanket practice in the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit. In fact, after the routine shackling ended, one judge be-
gan denying motions to unshackle if a child's parent was not present in court.'25
The public defenders quickly responded by dispatching appellate lawyers from
their office to observe hearings in the judge's division, and having office staff
"camera-ready" in the courtroom to record any incidents of indiscriminate shack-
ling by the judge, and this policy was terminated.
26
Despite this seeming incongruity, the Miami-Dade Public Defender's landmark
effort to "unchain the children" is an inspired case-study in lawyering for legal
reform and social change. The effort combined proactive courtroom litigation with
a variety of other traditional and out-of-the-box advocacy strategies, including
county commission, legislative and executive branch advocacy, 127 court and admin-
123. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
124. Carlos J. Martinez writes in an article:
In Miami Dade, since the first child was unshackled, more than 3,000 detained children
have appeared in court, few have been determined to be a flight or safety risk to justify
shackling. We have not had courtroom escapes or injuries caused by the detained but un-
shackled children. Despite seeing a high number of detained children in court each day, our
judges dispense justice one-child-at-a-time, without additional courtroom personnel. We do
not have armed officers in court.
Carlos J. Martinez, Challenging the Shackling of Juveniles in Court, 2 COD NETWORK NEWS-A NEWSLETTER
FOR THE COMMUNITY ORIENTED DEFENDER NETWORK 5 (July 2007).
125. Requiring a parent to be present in the courtroom before the judge would consider unshackling a child
would have been particularly callous and unfair to "crossover" children (i.e., dependent children in foster care with
delinquency charges), because many of these children do not have parents or guardians.
126. E-mail from Carlos J. Martinez, Chief Assistant Public Defender (Miami-Dade), to Bernard P. Perlmut-
ter, Assistant Professor of Clinical Legal Education, University of Miami School of Law (July 1, 2007, 07:06 p.m.
(EST)) (on file with author).
127. See, e.g., MIAMI-DADE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, RESOLUTION URGING THE
FLORIDA LEGISLATURE TO ENACT LEGISLATION BANNING THE USE OF INDISCRIMINATE CHAINS AND SHACKLES
ON DETAINED CHILDREN IN JUVENILE COURTROOMS; AND ESTABLISHING A PRESUMPTION OF NO CHAINS OR
SHACKLES ABSENT A SHOWING OF RISK TO SELF OR OTHERS, Agenda Item No. 14(A) (28) (Dec. 2006 (unani-
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istrative rulemaking, 128 state and national bar advocacy, 129 media,' 30 editorial and
op-ed advocacy,' 3' grassroots organizing, 132 community education,133 and even
artistic expression 34 as a means of educating the public about the practice and pro-
viding the children an outlet to vent their feelings about shackling. As Professor
Lucie White has written:
All litigation has both direct and indirect effects. In many cases,
the lawyer can seek simultaneously to persuade the judge and to
mobilize the public. The two goals-of winning a legal remedy
and influencing public consciousness-do not work at cross pur-
poses. On some occasions, however, typically in high visibility
political trials, lawyer and client may choose to spurn the legal
ground rules and sacrifice a favorable outcome precisely in order
mously approved)); H. 19, 2007 Leg., Sess. (Fla. 2007), and S. 372, 2007 Leg., Sess. (Fla. 2007) (curtailing the
use of "instruments of restraint, such as handcuffs, irons, or straightjackets," in the courtroom) (died in House
Comm. on Juv. Just. and S. Comm. on Crim. Just., May 4, 2007); Curt Anderson, Crist: Routine Shackling of
Juvenile Suspects is Wrong, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 12, 2006 ("I think it's only fair to judge these things on a
case-by-case basis," quoting then Florida Governor-elect Charlie Crist).
128. See, e.g., JUVENILE COURT RULES COMMITTEE'S RESPONSE CONCERNING PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY
THE FLORIDA BAR STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
SECTION OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Sept. 27, 2006 (on file with author) (voting by 9 (support), 8 (abstain), and 3
(oppose) to support proposed Florida Bar advocacy to "oppose the indiscriminate use of chains and shackles in
juvenile court proceedings, and encourage the adoption of a ban on the indiscriminate use of chains and shackles
in juvenile court proceedings through court rule, legislation and executive branch policy").
129. See, e.g., Shackled Juveniles Will Be Debated at General Meeting, THE FLORIDA BAR NEWS, Sept. 1,
2006, at 10; Pudlow, supra note 3, at 1.
See also National Juvenile Defender Center News Release, Legal System Shortchanges Florida's
Children: New Study Finds System Denies Justice for Many Young Offenders (Oct. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/florida_press_%2Orelease.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2007):
Glaringly, the Assessment also revealed that wrist and ankle shackles, sometimes with belly
chains, are routinely used on detained children every day in many juvenile courtrooms
across the state. Children were observed chained to each other or to fixed objects in the
courtrooms in several places. This demeaning practice has a chilling effect on the fair ad-
ministration ofjustice. Steps taken to halt the unnecessary practice of shackling children in
chain-gang like fashion in places like Miami and Broward are to be commended. Id. at 2.
130. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16; Maya Bell, Shackling of Juveniles Challenged-Public Defenders
Call Chaining Children Abusive, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2006, at B1; Graham Brink, Shackling in Juvenile
Courts Faces Test, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, at 6B; Carol Marbin Miller, Public Defenders Want
Chains Out of Juvenile Courts, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 11, 2006, at 3B; Abhi Raghunathan and Kevin Graham,
Lawyers Want Kids Unshackled in Court, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at 4B.
131. See, e.g., Editorial, Our Opinion: It's Inhumane to Put Children in Irons for Court, THE MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 13, 2006, at 20A; Juvenile Justice-Issue: Florida's Juveniles Endure a Practice Worthy of Chain
Gangs, SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 18, 2006, at 18A; Editorial, End the Shackling of Juveniles, St. Petersburg Times,
Oct. 3, 2006, at IOA; Editorial, Justice in Chains-Stop Shackling Children in Court, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS
JOURNAL, Nov. 25, 2006, at 04A; Dick J. Batchelor and Gustavo Barreiro, Other Views, Restrain Practice of Fear,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 22, 2006, at A20; Brian Cabrey, Vice President, Florida's Children First, Inc., Guest
Column: Ban Shackles on Juvenile Suspects, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Dec. 20, 2006, at B-7; cf Editorial, Shackles
and Safety-Our Position: Putting Restraints on Juveniles is Justified, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 13, 2006, at
AI0.
132. See Martinez, supra note 16, at 15 ("Our efforts did not begin or end in the courtroom. We spoke to
the media, reached out to the faith community, academics, social justice groups, other defenders and child advo-
cates of all stripes.").
133. Id.
134. Voice Project, supra note 2.
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to make the litigation speak most effectively to public conscious-
ness.
135
3. West Palm Beach County Litigation
The Miami-Dade unshackling litigation spawned similar efforts in other Flor-
ida circuits. Motions were filed in Broward, Hillsborough, Sumter, and other coun-
ties. While a handful of juvenile judges curtailed or abolished the practice, 136 it
remains in widespread use throughout the state. 137 A similar motion was filed by
the Palm Beach Public Defender's Office in October 2006 in the Fifteenth Judicial
135. Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS.
L. REv. 699, 759. For recent discussion of lawyering for legal reform and broader social change in the children's
rights context, see, e.g., Appell, supra note 2, at 721 ("Given the limitations of children's voice and the limited
efficacy of children's litigation and policy advocacy on improving justice for children, maybe we should be repre-
senting, or supporting organizing efforts of, parents and communities---those who have stronger voices and can
guide us more clearly.").
For a sampling of discussions of "collaborative," "rebellious," and allied forms of social justice lawyer-
ing, in other contexts, see, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Faith in Community: Representing "Colored Town, " 95 CAL.
L. REv. (forthcoming 2007); GERALD P. L)PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERiNG (1992); Gerald P. Lopez, Shaping
Community Problem Solving Around Community Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 59 (2004); Lucie E. White,
Collaborative Lawyering in the Field?, On Mapping Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, I CLINICAL L. REv. 157
(1994); Luke W. Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens and Grassroots Activists: Three Models of Environ-
mental Poverty Advocacy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 687 (1995); Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices: Lawyers,
Clients, and Social Change, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415 (1996).
136. See Brink, supra note 130, at 6B (quoting Broward juvenile court judge Larry Seidlin as calling "rou-
tine shackling repugnant and a 'throwback to 18th century Europe'."); Jon Burstein, Shackling of Youth Suspects
Ends; Rulings Free Accused Juveniles From Wearing Ankle Restraints, SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 2006, at 1B
(quoting Judge Seidlin as commenting, "'[s]ome of these children are 12 years old and picked up for misdemean-
ors like shoplifting... It's unconscionable to shackle these children."'); Nikki Waller, Shackling of Kids Curtailed
in Broward Courtrooms, THE MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 25, 2006, at lB (Broward County juvenile court judges ended
the indiscriminate practice of shackling juvenile offenders in their courtrooms, signing orders that found the prac-
tice detrimental for the youth.).
137. As indicated supra note 127, two bills were introduced in the 2007 Session of the Florida Legislature
(HB 19 and SB 372). The bills would have amended Florida Statute § 985.35 (adjudicatory hearings) and created
§985.602 by adding the following procedural safeguards designed to limit instruments of restraint in court pro-
ceedings:
985.602 Use of restraints during court proceedings prohibited; exceptions-
(1) Instruments of restraint, such as handcuffs, irons, or straightjackets may not be used on a
child during court proceedings and must be removed prior to the child's appearance before
the court unless the court finds that:
(a) Instruments of restraint are necessary to prevent harm to the child or another person.
(b) There are no less restrictive alternatives to prevent physical harm to the child or another
person, including, but not limited to, the presence of department personnel, law enforcement
officers, or bailiffs.
(c) The child has a history of disruptive courtroom behavior that has placed others in poten-
tially harmful situations or presents a substantial risk of inflicting physical harm on himself
or herself or others as evidenced by recent behavior.
(2) In using instruments of restraint, the department shall comply with its Protective Action
Response policy adopted under s. 985.645 (2) (a).
The bills failed to make it out of the House Juvenile Justice and the Senate Criminal Committees, and thus the
Florida Legislature was not given the opportunity to vote on the two amendments. Similar legislation has been
reintroduced in the Florida Senate for the 2008 session by Senator Fredericka Wilson (SB 140).
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Circuit. The Palm Beach litigation remained pending without resolution for over
nine months, thwarted by delays and other factors that deprived the children of a
ruling on their claim that shackling is unconstitutional, unlawful, and harmful. The
protracted litigation in the Juvenile Court resulted in the issuance of a two-page
order elevating courtroom security considerations over the children's constitu-
tional, legal, or therapeutic interests. The trial court's ruling in R.C. v. Judges of
the Juvenile Court, was upheld by the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal after
considerable delay on July 30, 2007, in a one-sentence unpublished order denying
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus "on the merits, without prejudice for indi-
vidual juveniles to move to remove shackles."'
38
A brief recapitulation of the tortuous procedural history of this litigation is in-
structive in that it describes a proceeding that allowed conclusory arguments about
courtroom security to dominate the discussion and excluded critical testimony nec-
essary for proper appellate review of the trial court's ruling. It also provides a
glimpse into how risk-averse courts are to changing the unwritten status quo when
addressing controversial practices such as shackling.
After the motion to unshackle was filed by the Palm Beach Public Defender,
the juvenile court issued an order requiring mediation between the various "inter-
ested parties" regarding the general policy of shackling juveniles. The Public De-
fender petitioned to the Fourth District Court of Appeal for habeas corpus relief
1 39
The district court quashed the portion of the lower court's order requiring media-
tion, and remanded the matter to the trial court to rule on the pending motion.
140
A second petition for habeas relief was filed in the Fourth District in December
2006 after the trial court delayed ruling on the pending motion for over six weeks.
The district court treated the petition as a motion to enforce its prior mandate that
the juvenile court judges rule on the petitioners' motion. The court denied the ha-
beas, "without prejudice to seek mandamus relief if the circuit court does not rule
on the motion within forty-five days."'
141
Finally, after months of delay and facing sanctions by the appeals court, the
court scheduled a "case management conference" in January 2007.142 Two judges
presided. Representatives from DJJ, the State Attorney, the Public Defender, and
the Sheriff's Office participated. The exchange between the judges and the partici-
pants is illuminating for the views expressed; many of the views were inconsistent
with or uninformed by research on adolescent development, adolescent criminal
138. See R.C. v. Juvenile Court Judges, Case No. 4D07-454 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); see also Juveniles to
Remain Shackled for County Court Appearances, PALM BEACH POST, Aug. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.iamforkids.org/newsdata/view ind/3848 (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
139. The Public Defender filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court treated as a
petition for a writ of certiorari. R.C. v. Juvenile Court Judges of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, 942 So.2d 1007
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
140. Id. The court declined to reach the merits of the claim regarding the illegality of the shackling policy,
holding that the issue was not yet ripe for review as the circuit court had not yet ruled on the unshackling motion.
Id. See also Nancy L. Othon, Juvenile Court to Reconsider Shackles, SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 6, 2006, at 9B (report-
ing on the appeals court's ruling on the mediation order).
141. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus #3, R.C. v. Juvenile Court Judges of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit,
Case No. 4D06-4338 (subsequently re-docketed as Case No. 4D07-454), Feb. 2, 2007, at 1-2 (on file with author).
142. Id.
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activity, or adolescent responses to punishment and rehabilitation. Most were con-
sumed with courthouse security considerations to the exclusion of any interest in
the impact of the practice on the children.
Both of the presiding judges interrogated the public defenders at length about
courtroom security and who would bear liability for any damage committed by
unshackled juveniles. 143 One of the judges suggested that damages liability should
be imputed to the public defender.' 44 The DJJ representative argued that the
agency's risk assessment instrument for secure detention was a suitable proxy for
any judicial process regarding the need to place a child in shackles.
The sergeant from the County Sheriffs Office supported continuation of the
shackling policy based on his view that children and adults in large groups behave
differently. 45 His conclusory statement was demonstrably at odds with research
suggesting that the solution is not to herd offenders in large groups but to bring
them into court individually. 46 The sergeant also argued that shackling was neces-
sary to deter the offenders from future criminal activity, again revealing a lack of
familiarity with current research. The most recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
suggests that teenagers are less susceptible to deterrence for the same reasons that
they have reduced culpability for criminal misconduct.
147
The judges declined to hear any testimony proffered by the public defenders
from the expert witnesses in childhood trauma, child development, and therapeutic
jurisprudence whose affidavits were filed in support of the motion. 148 The judges
143. Transcript of Hearing at 16, R.C. v Juvenile Court Judges, Case No. 2006CJ4506 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2007)
(on file with author):
[A]re you asking this Court to, I'm going to try to be as diplomatic as I can, you are asking
this Court that this Court has to abdicate its responsibility to the public--no, that's not the
right question. If it's DJJ policy, let's make sure the geographical boundaries are set up.
Once they come through that door, you will concede that it is the Court's responsibility as to
the security issues, correct?
144. Id. at 16-17:
Now, is the Public Defender's Office going to be willing to be responsible for any damages
caused by the children [who] do cause problems, [who] do not have a violent background,
do not have a history of escape, but do in fact cause violent acts in the Courtroom or on their
way out on an attempted escape? That is a legitimate question, I believe.
145. Id. at 24:
If you go into larger numbers, juveniles are different than adults. There is no doubt about it.
Their peer pressure is different. Their mindset is different. You can't reason as well. So to
compare what we do there with adults and children, it's not apples to apples. So, you know,
just our position is that we do what we do and we feel it is the safest and the best way to
handle it.
146. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Known Secret, 72
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 867, 867 (1981) (adolescent crime occurs in groups); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laur-
ence Steinberg, (Im)maturity and Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May be Less Culpable Than Adults,
18 BEHAV. SC. & L. 741, 757 (Adolescents, on average, are "less responsible, more myopic, and less temperate
than the average adult.").
147. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 ("[T]he absence of deterrent effect is of special concern because the same
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deter-
rence.").
148. The Order noted that the petitioners had not met their burden of proof (see Order Denying Motion,
supra note 120), which paradoxically was the result of the court's refusal to conduct a proper evidentiary hearing
at which they could present expert, factual and other testimony relevant to the motion.
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each issued an identical two-page order denying the motion. The decision's core
concern with security is encapsulated in this paragraph:
As a practical matter, the motion disregards the fact that the under-
signed judge is not a security expert, but maintains the responsibil-
ity to preserve order and decorum in the courtroom to protect all
those present. The record is completely devoid of any considera-
tion of the many and various issues that impact court security.
Such issues are more appropriately addressed through [an] Admin-
istrative Order issued by the Chief Judge after full consideration
and input by all those affected.
149
As noted, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was summarily denied by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal, in an unpublished order issued on July 30, 2007.150
Three weeks later, the Palm Beach Public Defender filed a virtually identical fed-
eral habeas petition, which remains pending before U.S. District Judge Donald
Middlebrooks.
151
E. Justifications for Shackling Children in Court
And so when you argue that we should simply tell D.J.J. or the
Sheriffs Office, whoever it may be, this policy is no good, get rid
of it and come up with something better, my concern is you are
asking us to abdicate that responsibility to them, telling them what
they have told us right now they need for security is no good, come
up with something better, the bottom line is if something does hap-
pen in Court, that does become our liability.
-Juvenile Court Judge
152
As the Duval, Miami-Dade, and Palm Beach County litigation shows, the justi-
fications for using shackles are both practical and philosophical. In practical terms,
some judges are fearful that unshackling juveniles will cause disorder and mayhem
in their courtrooms. These fears reflect a more fundamental, unspoken premise,
viz., that juvenile court proceedings are no longer able to effectively control the
problems of juvenile crime and, therefore, that the historical rehabilitation and
treatment purposes of the juvenile court should be supplanted by more punitive
measures and procedures.
149. Order Denying Motion, supra note 120.
150. See supra note 138.
151. R.C. v. Flowers, Case No. 9:07-cv-80761-DMM (S.D. Fla.); see also Jane Musgrave, Shackling of
Juveniles in Court Criticized, PALM BEACH POST (Aug. 25, 2007).
152. Transcript of Hearing at 20, R.C. v Juvenile Court Judges of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Case No.
2006CJ4506 (Jan. 17, 2007) (on file with author).
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The hearings on public defender motions to unshackle children have given ju-
venile judges, law enforcement officials, and DJJ representatives opportunities to
express support for the existing policy. The stated justifications rely on many out-
moded and inaccurate myths about juvenile crime. They are based on sweepingly
erroneous generalizations about children. Some judges argue that shackling is ac-
tually beneficial for children. 53 Others say that it deters children from participat-
ing in future or further delinquent activity. 154 Judges and law enforcement agencies
fret about courtroom security threats posed by unshackled children. 55 Judges
cross-examine public defenders about how the State could assume liability for hy-
pothetical damages or injuries inflicted by their clients. 15 6 One judge even suggests
making the public defender pay for damages or injuries perpetrated by unshackled
children. 5 7 The judges who have upheld the existing practices assume virtually
unfettered authority to condone shackling as part of their duty to maintain order in
the courtroom.
Carlos Martinez, the Chief Assistant Public Defender in Miami-Dade, and the
most publicly outspoken critic of these policies, has written that the judges, by ab-
dicating to law enforcement and DJJ on this issue, fail to acknowledge the uniquely
distinct roles played by judges and law enforcement officials inside the courtroom:
In Florida, judges have authority over what happens in the court-
room and the juvenile courtrooms are open to the general public.
Deputy sheriffs and bailiffs are there to assist the judge in main-
taining order. The irony here is that allowing anyone to have guns
in the courtroom increases the likelihood that the judge, courtroom
personnel, the children and the public will be killed or seriously in-
jured. Yet, most juvenile court judges have abdicated their author-
ity over courtroom decorum and safety. In Miami Dade, the gen-
eral public is checked for weapons prior to entering the courthouse,
and officers are not allowed to carry guns inside the courtrooms.
58
The second, more fundamental justification for shackling reflects long-standing
frustration with the limitations of the contemporary juvenile court, which is seen as
lacking in the resources and support to deal effectively with the public perception
of escalating and more violent juvenile crime. The frustration has spawned a na-
tional discourse about whether the juvenile court should become punishment fo-
cused or remain rehabilitation focused. Recent years have seen a shift away from
the juvenile court's historical emphasis on treatment towards a punishment model
resembling criminal court proceedings without either the due process benefits of
the criminal court or the rehabilitative resources necessary for a properly function-
153. See discussion supra Part II.D.2 and Part II.D.3.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
157. Id.
158. Martinez, supra note 16, at 11.
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ing juvenile court. This frustration has also led to calls for the abolition of the ju-
venile court as an anachronistic institution with an outdated ideology that "provides
young offenders with neither therapy nor justice."'5 9
The impetus to shackle also appears related to the enactment of legislation in
virtually every state permitting more juveniles to be tried in adult court. 160 It runs
parallel to other stringent or punitive legislative measures, many reacting to media-
driven perceptions of juvenile offenders as "superpredators.,' 61 Florida has been a
"leader ' ' 62 in enacting more stringent transfer laws giving prosecutors significantly
159. Feld, supra note 7 at 68:
Within the past three decades, judicial decisions, legislative amendments, and administrative
changes have transformed the juvenile court from a nominally rehabilitative social welfare
agency into a scaled-down second-class criminal court for young people. These reforms
have converted the historical ideal of the juvenile court as a social welfare institution into a
penal system that provides young offenders with neither therapy nor justice.
See also Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part 11: Race and the "Crack
Down " on Youth Crime [hereinafter Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court], 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 340
(1999) ("During the turbulent 1960's, increases in youth crime and in urban racial disorders provoked politicians'
cries for 'law and order' and encouraged adoption of measures to 'get tough' and to repress, rather than rehabili-
tate, young offenders."); Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 1118 ("Once the imagined nature of childhood changed and
the child-adult dichotomy blurred, the ideological justification for a separate juvenile jurisprudence evaporated...
Perpetuating an anachronistic juvenile court exacts its own costs, both ideological and practical. These costs
compel me to conclude that the juvenile court ought to be abolished.").
Cf. Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolition-
ists, 1993 WiS. L. REV. 163, 184 (1993) ("Abandoning the juvenile court is an admission that its humane purposes
were misguided or unattainable. I do not believe that. We should stay and fight-fight for a reordering of societal
resources, one that will protect and nourish children... We can and should seek both procedural and dispositional
reform in the juvenile courts.").
160. See Patrick Griffin, National Center for Juvenile Justice and U.S. Department of Justice, Trying and
Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws 12 (Oct. 2003);
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 13-14 (1998).
161. Sociologists, criminologists and the media began using the term "superpredator" over ten years ago.
See, e.g., Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy is the Preadolescent's Best
Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 177 (2000) ("The superpredator moniker marks a new era in
the labeling of violent juveniles. The widespread use of the term by politicians, scholars, and the media implies a
validation of its concept and confers upon it a quasi-scientific legitimacy."); WILLIAM J. BENNETr, JOHN J.
DILULIO, JR., & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY-AND How TO WIN AMERICA'S WAR
AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS (1996).
But just as the superpredator label was entering popular and legislative discourse, juvenile crime began
to subside. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 806-11
(2003) (referring to negative stereotypes of juvenile offenders as "super-predators" and contemporary juvenile
justice policy as a response to a "moral panic" not justified by the real public safety threats posed by juveniles);
David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused": The Changing Legal
Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 642-43 (2002) (noting that lower rates of
juvenile crime from 1994 to 2000, despite increases in the juvenile population, prompted many supporters of
"super-predator" theory to back away from their predictions); Howard N. Snyder and Melissa Sicknund,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL CRIME REPORT
133 (2006), available at http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf (last visited Sept. 28,
2007) (national data showing that between 1994 and 2003, juvenile arrests for violent crime fell proportionately
more than adult arrests); YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5 (2001), available at
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS9293 (last visited Sept. 28, 2007) (reporting that there was "no evidence that
young people involved in crime during the peak years of the early 1990's were more frequent or more vicious
offenders than youth in earlier years").
162. See, e.g., FLORIDA DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, BUREAU OF DATA AND RESEARCH, A DJJ SUCCESS
STORY: TRENDS IN TRANSFER OF JUVENILES TO ADULT CRIMINAL COURT 5 (Jan. 8, 2002). In keeping with this
trend, the Florida legislature has enacted a variety of statutory mechanisms for prosecution of juveniles in adult
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greater authority to direct-file juveniles to adult court and to seek grand jury in-
dictments of juveniles.' 63 These changes have been driven by the same concerns
about public safety that have prompted the use of courtroom shackling as a precau-
tionary security measure in Florida and other states.
Ironically, expanded prosecutorial direct-file and enlarged grand jury indict-
ment authority means that a less violence-prone segment of the population remains
in the juvenile justice system and the supposedly more violent offenders are prose-
cuted as adults. 64 Paradoxically, criminal defendants in the adult system are rarely
shackled in such a routine and indiscriminate manner, whereas children in the ju-
venile court are.
165
F. Advocacy in Other Jurisdictions to Abolish Shackling Children in
Court
Although the use of shackles is reported in more than half of the states,"66 there
is a similar lack of statutory or agency authority to use restraints inside the court-
room in other jurisdictions. 67 At least three states have recently addressed the le-
court, including discretionary waiver, prosecutorial waiver (or direct-file), and grand jury indictment of juveniles
charged with capital or life felonies. Id. at 6.
Despite Florida's claims of reducing juvenile crime through its transfer policies, some studies have
questioned whether prosecutors apply discretion to waive children over to adult court in a fair and even-handed
manner, especially at a time when fewer juveniles were arrested for violent crimes. See, e.g., Vincent Schiraldi &
Jason Ziedenberg, CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE FLORIDA EXPERIMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE IMPACT OF GRANTING PROSECUTORS DISCRETION TO TRY JUVENILES AS ADULTS 3-4 (1999), available at
http://www.cjcj.org/pubs/florida/florida.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2007) (finding that 28% of youth waived over
to adult court were charged with violent crimes, and over 50% were charged with non-violent crimes against
property).
163. See, e.g., Henry George White, Charles E. Frazier & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, A Socio-Legal History of
Florida's Juvenile Transfer Reforms, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 249 (1999) (describing "get tough" on juvenile
crime and frustrations with "pampering" of juvenile offenders as two rationales to support juvenile justice reform
in Florida); Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, Charles E. Frazier & Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Transfers in Florida: The
Worst of the Worst?, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227 (1999) (presenting data indicating that changes in Flor-
ida's transfer laws have had little impact on the number of offenders transferred to adult court).
164. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 985.556, 985.557, 985.56 (2007) (detailing statutory criteria for discretionary
judicial waiver, discretionary and mandatory prosecutorial waiver (direct-filing), and grand jury indictment of
juveniles). See also Michael J. Dale, Making Sense of the Lionel Tate Case, 28 NOVA L. REV. 467 (2004) (dis-
cussing Florida's application of adult criminal charges and the adult criminal justice process to children who
commit very serious offenses and the roles of judges, prosecutors and defense counsel in these cases); cf Paolo
Annino, Children in Florida Adult Prisons: A Call for a Moratorium, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 477 (2001)
(taking issue with the popular belief that many children imprisoned for adult crimes are more violent than those
who are prosecuted in the juvenile justice system, and noting that empirical study of first offenders imprisoned in
the adult system "establishes that for this group of children in adult prison, the juvenile justice system never had an
opportunity to succeed because it was never given a chance").
165. See Martinez, supra note 16:
Jailed adult defendants are not routinely shackled in court in many Florida counties. In Mi-
ami-Dade wholesale shackling of children began in 2004. We had a situation where a child
was shackled in juvenile court, but if that child were transferred (direct filed) to adult court,
he would not be shackled in adult court if he did not pose a physical danger to himself or
others, or was not an escape risk. Id. at 11.
166. See supra note 6.
167. A compilation of juvenile justice shackling policies for all fifty states and the District of Columbia,
prepared by University of Miami School of Law reference librarian Whitney A. Curtis, appended to this article,
reveals that at least forty-three states have statutes, regulations, juvenile justice agency policies or other written
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gality of the practice through published decisions or statutory amendment and the
issue has been catapulted to national prominence through the media and discus-
sions in the "blogosphere.' ' 168 Within the space of four months, the North Dakota
Supreme Court, a California intermediate appeals court, and the North Carolina
General Assembly have each restricted the use of shackles and mandated standards
for courts to apply in imposing this measure on detained juvenile offenders in the
courtroom.
1. North Dakota
The North Dakota Supreme Court issued a constitutionally-grounded decision
applying the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Deck v. Missouri,'69 which barred the
use of shackles before juries at the penalty phase of capital trials, to adjudicatory
hearings in juvenile delinquency court. In In the Interest of R. W.S., 17° the court
held that a juvenile court referee violated the offender's constitutional rights by
refusing to remove his handcuffs at an evidentiary hearing, deferring to the sher-
iff's office's policies on courtroom security, 17 1 without first independently deciding
the necessity of restraints.
The child, charged and convicted by the juvenile court of burglary, robbery,
and disorderly conduct, argued that keeping him in handcuffs during his adjudica-
tory hearing "impaired his physical movement and mental faculties, caused psy-
chological harm, interfered with his ability to testify, and was an affront to the dig-
nity of the hearing.' ' 72 Applying the due process analysis of Deck, the court held
that the juvenile's due process rights were violated by the juvenile court's refusal
to assess whether the child posed an immediate and serious risk of dangerous or
guidelines (including case law, Department of Justice civil rights investigations, settlement agreements, and other
policies created by agencies voluntarily or as a result of litigation or investigation) regarding the use of instruments
of restraint in juvenile justice programs. Of those states with written policies or laws, shackling is used on a regu-
lated basis primarily in detention facilities and when transporting youth. No states have written policies expressly
permitting the use of restraints in the courtroom. See 50 state and District of Columbia shackling survey infra at
Appendix.
Although not every state has promulgated statutes, regulations or written policies on the use of physical
and mechanical restraints in juvenile justice programs, the national Council of Juvenile Correctional Administra-
tors recommends that all states do so. See Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators, Position Paper on:
Physical and Mechanical Interventions With Juveniles (2003), available at
http://cjca.net/photos/content/documents/Interventions.pdf (last visited Sept 28, 2007). The position paper recom-
mends that all jurisdictions have written policies regarding the use of physical interventions or restraints in juve-
nile detention facilities as a last resort; which would include use of restraints: only following prudent preventative
screening, classification and programmatic interventions; only when de-escalation of a crisis has failed and the
need to protect staff, other youth or property is necessary; only by trained individuals and only used defensively
and in a manner that provides maximum safety for staff and youths; for as long as the youth presents a danger to
self, others or property; and with medical, mental health and/or administrative case review of interventions as part
of quality assurance.
168. See, e.g., USA TODAY ON DEADLINE, Should Florida Shackle Kids in Court?,
http://blogs.usatoday.com/ondeadline/2006/09/shouldflorida_.html (last visited July 6, 2007) (over 73 comments
posted as of July 6, 2007).
169. Deck, 544 U.S. at 622; see discussion infra Part IV.D.
170. In the Interests of R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326 (N.D. 2007).
171. ld at 328.
172. Id. at 329.
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disruptive behavior or of escape or flight prior to denying his request to remove the
handcuffs during the adjudicatory hearing. 73 The court also held that the referee
erred by leaving the decision of whether to physically restrain the juvenile to the
judgment of law enforcement officials rather than deciding this matter himself. 74
The court rejected arguments that jury trials are different than juvenile court
proceedings tried before a judge for three reasons. First, the prejudice to the child
means more than being seen by a jury in visible physical restraints, and includes
the prejudice from the "'inhibition of free consultation with counsel."" 75 Second,
"'extending the right to remain unshackled during juvenile proceedings is conso-
nant with the rehabilitative purposes' of the juvenile justice system.,' 76 And lastly,
a "therapeutic jurisprudence" reason, "'[a]llowing a young person who poses no
security hazard to appear before the court unshackled, with the dignity of a free and
innocent person, may foster respect for the judicial process."
77
For R.W.S., however, this was a pyrrhic victory. Despite holding that his due
process rights were violated by the juvenile referee's refusal to remove his hand-
cuffs at trial, the court found harmless error based on the "overwhelming" evidence
of guilt presented, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 178 Nevertheless, the
decision's analysis should be instructive to courts in other jurisdictions considering
the constitutional implications of this practice.
2. California
Considering a similar challenge to the propriety of a juvenile court's shackling
policy in Southern California, an appeals court declared the policy unlawful under
state law, rejecting the lower court's justification of the policy as necessary to pre-
vent escape attempts and maintain order in the courthouse. 79 In striking down the
practice, the court held that the trial court was obligated to conduct an individual
assessment of the need to shackle, and that courthouse security concerns could not
trump individualized assessments of dangerousness and risk posed by juvenile of-
fenders:
[W]e conclude that any decision to shackle a minor.., must be
based on the non-conforming conduct and behavior of that indi-
vidual minor. Moreover, the decision to shackle a minor must be
made on a case-by-case basis . . . [T]he Juvenile Delinquency
Court may not, as it did here, justify the use of shackles solely on
173. Id. at 331.
174. Id. (citing In re Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)) (holding that a conclusory statement
by a law enforcement officer or prosecutor of a juvenile's serious risk of dangerous behavior was a legally and
factually inadequate reason to allow shackling in the courtroom, and that this was a decision requiring the inde-
pendent exercise of discretion by the court).
175. R. W.S., 728 N.W.2d at 330 (quoting In re Millican, 906 P.2d at 860).
176. Id. (citation omitted).
177. Id. (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 331-32.
179. Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr.3d at 363.
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the inadequacy of the courtroom facilities or the lack of available
security personnel to monitor them.
80
The court relied on California case law to declare that juvenile court proceed-
ings, no less than adult criminal court proceedings, are obligated to comport with
the values and protections of fundamental fairness, dignity, and respect. In sweep-
ing language, the court held that denying a child an individualized judicial deter-
mination of the need to shackle would defeat the essential and defining purposes of
juvenile proceedings. These defining purposes are to assure individualized atten-
tion from the court in order to further the goal of rehabilitation for the child:
In our view, the constitutional presumption of innocence, the right
to present and participate in the defense, the interest in maintaining
human dignity and the respect for the entire judicial system, are
among these essentials whether the accused is 41 or 14. Moreover,
the rationale of the California cases--that the Constitution does
not require juveniles to have the full complement of rights afforded
adult defendants because to do so would introduce a tone of crimi-
nality into juvenile proceedings-would not be served by requiring
all juveniles, irrespective of the charges against them, or their con-
duct in custody, to wear shackles during all court proceedings.
The use of shackles in a courtroom absent a case-by-case, individ-
ual showing of need creates the very tone of criminality juvenile
proceedings were intended to avoid ... Given the rehabilitative
objectives of the juvenile justice system, we conclude, a juvenile
has the same right to an individual determination of need for the
use of shackles as enjoyed by an adult criminal defendant. 18'
The court issued a writ of prohibition setting aside the juvenile court's policy
of using physical restraints on all children in delinquency proceedings, and man-
dated individual hearings regarding their use in the courtroom. 182 This decision
should be helpful to courts in other jurisdictions regarding the legality of these
policies under state law.
3. North Carolina
On June 14, 2007, both chambers of the North Carolina General Assembly
voted unanimously to ratify a bill that provides a standard procedure for deciding
when to use restraints on detained juveniles in the courtroom. 83 Governor Michael
F. Easley signed the bill into law on June 20th. 184 Under the new law, a judge can
180. Id. at 373.
181. Id. at 375.
182. Id. at 376.
183. H.R.,1243, 2007 Session (N.C. 2007) (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-7B (2007)).
184. 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 100.
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only allow a juvenile to be restrained in the courtroom to maintain order in the
court, prevent the juvenile's escape, or provide for the safety of the courtroom.
The judge, when practical, must allow the juvenile and the juvenile's attorney a
hearing to contest the decision prior to the use of restraints:
At any hearing authorized or required by this Subchapter, the
judge may subject a juvenile to physical restraint in the courtroom
only when the judge finds the restraint to be reasonably necessary
to maintain order, prevent the juvenile's escape, or provide for the
safety of the courtroom. Whenever practical, the judge shall pro-
vide the juvenile and the juvenile's attorney an opportunity to be
heard to contest the use of restraints before the judge orders the use
of restraints. If restraints are ordered, the judge shall make find-
ings of fact in support of the order.'
85
III. GAULT AND THE SHACKLING OF CHILDREN
In re Gault is celebrated for holding that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,'' 186 and that the Fourteenth Amendment is
violated when a child charged with a delinquent act is denied notice of the charges,
the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to con-
frontation and cross-examination in the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile court
process. Justice Fortas's decision carefully limited its holding to the constitutional
protections that apply to the procedural requirements at this stage with the caveat
that it had "no necessary applicability to other steps of the juvenile process,' 87 or
to the "totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state.' 88 Despite the self-
imposed limitations on breadth and scope, the decision's sweeping language, wide-
ranging historical perspective, and the multi-disciplinary methodology underpin-
185. Id. As in Florida, the legislative effort was preceded by juvenile court litigation filed on behalf of
shackled children by their public defenders. See Jonathan D. Jones, Group: Limit Use of Cuffs on Kids,
GREENSBORO NEWS-REcoRD, Feb. 5,2007, at Al. According to the bill's sponsor, Rep. Angela Bryant:
There was a statutory procedure for restraining adults in court but not for juveniles. The gap
had resulted in some instances of the indiscriminate shackling of juveniles in court around
the state without a standard procedure to consider each individual child. This bill, while still
protecting the judge's authority to preserve order and safety in the courtroom, also protects
the child's right to fairness, dignity, humane treatment and due process.
Bryant Bill to Protect Juveniles Heads to Governor, CAROLINA NEWSWIRE, June 20, 2007. Unlike similar but
unsuccessful legislative efforts in Florida, the North Carolina legislation was supported by that state's Department
of Juvenile Justice, which banded together with a broad coalition, including the law firm of Kilpatrick Stockton
LLP of Raleigh (pro bono counsel), the Juvenile Defender's Office, legal services organizations, and children's
advocacy groups around the state. Id.
186. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
187. Id. at 31 n. 48; see also id. at 12 ("For example, we are not here concerned with the procedures or
constitutional rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our attention to
the post-adjudicative or dispositional process.").
188. Id. at 13.
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ning its analysis suggest a much broader judicial agenda for expansion of constitu-
tional protections into other contexts and phases of the juvenile court process. 8 9
Although the Gault Court's analysis focused on the lack of procedural safe-
guards in the adjudicatory phase of the delinquency process it represents a far
broader critique of the parens patriae'90 ideology of the juvenile court in which
"unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substi-
tute for principle and procedure."' 19 Because the critique was directed to the ideol-
ogy and culture of juvenile court proceedings as much as to the specific procedural
deficiencies at issue in the Arizona juvenile court proceedings, there is little doubt
that the Gault Court would fimd routine indiscriminate shackling a thoroughly rep-
rehensible practice. The Court would recoil at the unbridled discretion exercised
by those judges who tolerate and even encourage this practice to be carried out in
their courtrooms in 2007, for the same reason that it found juvenile court practices
in 1967 to be unconstitutional and unfair to Gerald Gault:
The absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant
that children receive careful, compassionate, individualized treat-
ment. The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional
principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective pro-
cedures. Departures from established principles of due process
have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbi-
trariness.1
92
A. The Effects of Shackling on the Child's Right to Counsel
Gault is most celebrated for holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that, in any proceeding which may result in the loss of a child's freedom, "the child
and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel
retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel be appointed
to represent the child."' 93 Shackling a child interferes with the child's fundamental
due process right to the "guiding hand of counsel"' 94 deemed so essential to help
the juvenile "cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to
insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a de-
189. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 532-33
(1988) ("Even more important than [Gault's] new set of guarantees was Fortas's flowing language in the opinion
and his vast body of citations of supporting psychological, historical, and sociological data. It was clear that given
time he would be willing to write into law a still greater set of protections for juvenile defendants."). See also Abe
Fortas, Equal Rights-For Whom?, 42 N.Y.U. L.REv. 401, 405-407 (1967) (elaborating rationales for ending the
juvenile court's historical treatment of children "as constitutional nonpersons and outside of the much criticized
shelter of constitutional protections .... ").
190. Gault, 387 U.S. at 16 ("The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize
the exclusion ofjuveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are
of dubious relevance.")
191. Id. at 18.
192. Id. at 18-19.
193. Id. at 41.
194. Id. at 36 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
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fense.''195 Just as shackles "impos[e] physical burdens, pains, and restraints" on an
adult criminal defendant, "tend to confuse and embarrass" his "mental faculties,"
and, therefore, "materially ...abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional
rights,"'196 in the case of a child facing allegations of delinquency, the prejudicial
effects of shackles in the courtroom, in practical, clinical, and constitutional terms,
are markedly more severe and debilitating.
First, handcuffing a child handicaps the child's ability to communicate with
counsel. Putting cuffs on the child's wrists impairs the child's motor coordination,
making it difficult to write messages to counsel while the hearing is in progress, if
talking to the defense lawyer is impractical. Second, research on the problems
manifested by children in the juvenile justice system reveals that most "are affected
by trauma, at least half are struggling with learning disabilities, and all are limited
by their childish thinking."' 97 Because these conditions are already known to im-
pair their ability to assist counsel, chaining a child in the courtroom may even fur-
ther hamper the child's ability to communicate and interact with counsel due not
only to physical handicaps or discomforts associated with cuffs or shackles, but to
psychological effects. Like adults, but even more so, shackled children are likely
to be confused or embarrassed by their restraints. 198 Third, beyond impairing the
child's physical ability to communicate and causing the child to have a lowered
self-image, shackling may exact a coercive effect on the child's ability to freely
and voluntarily decide whether to engage in plea-bargaining or to proceed to trial.
The restraints may in fact coerce the child to believe that he must waive rights to
counsel, to trial, or to plea bargain in order to have the shackles removed. 99
Thus, the impairment of a child's physical movement and mental faculties,
psychological harm, and interference with the child's ability to assist counsel
caused by shackling, constitute significant burdens to the child's constitutionally
guaranteed right to be guided by counsel during a hearing.
B. Gault and the Psychology of Procedural Justice
A key insight of the Gault decision was its view, bolstered by policy research
and empirical evidence, that "the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness,
195. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
196. Deck, 544 U.S. at 631 (quoting People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168 (1871)). See generally ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY 15-3.2, at 188-91 (1996) (describing vari-
ous constitutional and practical dimensions of a criminal defendant's right to be free of physical restraints at trial).
197. Marty Beyer, Developmentally Sound Practice in Family and Juvenile Court, 6 NEv. L.J. 1215, 1215
(2006).
198. See Beyer Affidavit, supra Part II.D.2, 9-10 (courtroom shackling of children causes them shame
and humiliation, causing them to think less of themselves).
199. Although beyond the scope of this article, Gault's view of coercion in the police interrogation context
and the considerable literature on adolescent waiver of Miranda rights may have some relevance to waivers of
rights resulting from courtroom shackling. See generally Gault, 387 U.S. at 55 ("[T]he greatest care must be
taken to assure that [a minor's] admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or sug-
gested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.");
Barry C. Feld, Juveniles' Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 91
MINN. L. REV. 26 (2006); THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF PIGHTS in PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND
PSYCHOLOGY Vol. 3 (1981) (exploring coercion and disparity of power in the juvenile context).
Fall 2007
Barry Law Review
impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due process-may be a
more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is con-
cerned., 200 The Court relied on three studies for this proposition. The first, pre-
pared by sociologists Stanton Wheeler and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., referred to a
research study then being conducted by the National Council of Juvenile Court
Judges, regarding the benefits of providing children with legal counsel not just on
the quality of decisions rendered by judges but "on the juveniles themselves, and
juveniles' perception of the processes of justice as manifested by the court.'2 1
Justice Fortas gleaned this observation from the Wheeler/Cottrell study to support
his conclusion that denying children due process protections would have a negative
impact on the child's rehabilitation prospects: "[W]hen the procedural laxness of
the 'parens patriae' attitude is followed by stem disciplining, the contrast may
have an adverse effect upon the child, who feels that he has been deceived or en-
ticed., 20 2 The Court quoted a conclusion of the Wheeler/Cottrell study in support
of the proposition that increasing due process safeguards would have a salutary
effect on the child's amenability to rehabilitation: "Unless appropriate due process
of law is followed, even the juvenile who has violated the law may not feel that he
is being fairly treated and may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court
personnel. 20 3
The other two studies cited by the Court similarly endorsed the view that the
lax attitude of the juvenile court and the informality of the court process, "contrary
to the original expectation, may themselves constitute a further obstacle to effective
treatment of the delinquent to the extent that they engender in the child a sense of
injustice provoked by the seemingly all-powerful and challengeless exercise of
authority by judges and probation officers.
' 204
The importance of these insights, gained from research in criminology, sociol-
ogy, and public policy, cannot be underestimated. They represent the "procedural
justice' 20 5 policy underpinning of the due process analysis in the opinion and are
200. Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
201. STANTON WHEELER & LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-ITS PREVENTION AND
CONTROL (1966) 33. The Wheeler/Cottrell study was prepared at the request of the Secretary of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare. Id.
202. Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
203. WHEELER & COTTRELL, supra note 201, at 33.
204. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN
A FREE SOCIETY 85 (1967) (quoted in Gault, 387 U.S. at 26, n.37). See also FRANCES A. ALLEN, THE
BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE-ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY (1964) (cited in Gault, 387 U.S. at 26,
n.37).
A child brought before a tribunal, more or less specifically charged with commission of par-
ticular acts, will feel, and I believe will properly feel that he has the right to receive from the
court a sober and cautious weighing of the evidence relating to that issue. He has, in short, a
right to receive not only the benevolent concern of the tribunal but justice. One may ques-
tion with reason the value of therapy purchased at the expense of justice.
ALLEN, at 19.
205. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 38. Psychologist Gary B. Melton, in Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New
Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146, 167-77 (1989), analyzes this insight as part of his study of the construct of
the new juvenile court. In calling for increased procedural protection for children in delinquency proceedings, he
notes that "the most fundamental point that must be recognized is that liberty and privacy are important to children
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notable for recognizing the importance of the child's perception of the fundamental
unfairness of an arbitrary court proceeding, seeing the proceeding through the
child's viewpoint, and empathizing with the child's feelings of unfairness and
powerlessness vis-A-vis the entire court process. In addition to demonstrating an
awareness of the psychology of procedural justice, the opinion's focus on the
child's feelings and perceptions of fairness in the process as key elements of the
child's amenability to rehabilitation augurs the approach of therapeutic jurispru-
dence scholarship, which considers the therapeutic or anti-therapeutic conse-
quences on litigants of court proceedings and processes.2 °6
Research in the psychology of procedural justice examines how individuals
feel the legal system has treated them. If they believe that they have been treated
with fairness, respect, and dignity, the experience has positive therapeutic conse-
quences for them. In addition, the experience promotes changes in their conduct
that reduce the likelihood of recidivism and improve their prospects for rehabilita-
tion. The research demonstrates that judicial procedures are the primary criteria by
which litigants judge the fairness of the process.0 7
Thus, the question of whether the practice of holding juvenile offenders in
shackles would be countenanced by the Gault Court can be answered by examining
the Court's views of the child's perceptions of the fairness of juvenile court proc-
ess. The Gault Court saw the absence of procedural rules, the arbitrary hearing
process in the Arizona court, and the court's paternalistic treatment of Gerald
Gault, as having anti-therapeutic and anti-rehabilitative consequences. Analo-
gously, the practice of shackling juveniles in Florida courtrooms without making
individualized judicial assessments of the need to shackle sets in motion psycho-
logical forces that undermine rehabilitation. A blanket policy, uninformed by any
statutory standards, procedural rules, or administrative guidelines, will likely be
seen by the child as arbitrary and unfair and will therefore undermine the child's
amenability to treatment.
and youth, just as they are to adults." Id. at 167. He elaborates on this important point by analyzing the relevance
of the social psychology of procedural justice to the new juvenile court, and proposes using empirical study to help
understand how children respond to their treatment in the juvenile court and by other agencies within the juvenile
justice system. Id. at 168-69. He calls for empirical research to help policymakers fashion the "procedures needed
to ensure both that respondents are treated fairly and that theyfeel they are being treated fairly." Id. at 174 (em-
phasis in original). This plea is very much in line with the scholarly and research agendas of therapeutic jurispru-
dence. See infra note 292, and Part V.
206. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Enhancing the Relationship Between Law and
Psychology, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY-CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (Belinda Brooks-Gordon and Michael Free-
man, eds., 2006) ("Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that law should value psychological health, should strive to
avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values served by
law, should attempt to bring about healing and wellness." Id at 33.). See also discussion infra Part V.
207. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
(1988); E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns
in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990); JOHN THIBAULT & LAURENS WALKER,
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 83-84, 94-95, 115 (1975); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW (1990).
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C. How Gault Views Shackling
Gault's repudiation of the arbitrary process in the Arizona juvenile court thus
carries a powerful message for the unbridled discretion exercised four decades later
by state court judges reluctant to require or establish procedural guidelines, based
on constitutional principle, for individualized determinations of necessity before
children can be shackled in their courtrooms. If anything, they demonstrate cava-
lier disregard for the severe deprivation of liberty suffered by shackled children,
reminiscent of the complacency shown by the Arizona juvenile court judge toward
Gerald Gault's six years of lost freedom at the euphemistic "industrial school. 2 °8
They show a return to the laxness of the pre-Gault juvenile court, coupled with a
view that the court is less an instrument for rehabilitation than for punishment.
And they reflect acquiescence by the judiciary to unconstitutional and punitive
practices by DJJ, which is able to carry out indiscriminate shackling with impunity
free from any checks or oversight by the court.2 °9
Indeed, some of the shackling hearings in Florida's juvenile courts bring to
mind Gault's acerbic descriptions of the early juvenile court as a "star chamber
proceeding with the judge imposing his own particular brand of culture and morals
on indigent people' 20 in which children were treated as chattel. 21' The hearing
transcript in Sumter County reveals a disconcertingly informal culture of paternal-
ism toward children, in which the judge treats the child who appears before him in
shackles with very little regard for the child's loss of liberty and virtually none of
the "care and solicitude" that defined the juvenile court in the pre-Gault era.212 The
208. Gault, 387 U.S. at 27.
209. By contrast, three decades ago, U.S. District Judge Constance Motley, in hearing a challenge to the
constitutionality of shackling, seclusion and other disciplinary practices routinely deployed at a juvenile correc-
tional facility in New York State, held that they violated the children's constitutional right to substantive due
process and to rehabilitation. Pena v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In so doing,
she forcefully asserted her judicial responsibility to oversee executive branch treatment of the children and to
enforce their rights to substantive due process and rehabilitative care:
This is a task for which the judiciary perhaps is not ideally suited, yet it is a task which must
be assumed in cases such as this, where there is a clear showing that plaintiffs' rights under
the Constitution... have been violated. In undertaking this task, the court views its role not
to be that of ultimate purveyor of standards of treatment. Rather, it sees itself as a guiding
force in an evolutionary process. By specifically declaring certain practices to be unconsti-
tutional, the court is attempting to furnish parameters for those administering the juvenile
justice system, but those parameters are not inflexible. As the science of treatment in such
cases matures, one can expect new insights as to effective therapy and, in turn, new parame-
ters. While the task of evaluating such changes falls first on the executive branch of the sys-
tem, the judiciary may be compelled to intervene periodically to objectively evaluate new
developments. The interplay between administrator and judge which results is meant to be
mutually supportive and constructive rather than competitive. Id. at 207.
210. Gault, 387 U.S. at 19 n.25.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 9, at 120. Judge Mack, in his widely cited article, famously observed:
The child who must be brought into court should, of course, be made to know that he is face
to face with the power of the state, but he should at the same time, and more emphatically,
be made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude ... The judge on a bench,
looking down upon the boy standing at the bar.., where he can on occasion put his arm
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Florida shackling hearings thus exemplify how "the focus of delinquency hearings
from a child's 'real needs' [shifted] to proof of legal guilt and formalized the con-
nection between criminal conduct and coercive intervention."
21 3
The acquiescence toward shackling in juvenile courts thus compels us to ask
whether we have returned full-circle to the pre-Gault era oblivious to the reforms
ushered in by that decision.214 Do we see children as needing fewer due process
rights because of their vulnerability, immaturity (or impulsivity), and inability to
make sound decisions?215 Have we reduced our understanding of their rights to the
supposed truism that children have a right "not to liberty but to custody?, 216 Is a
child's right to the panoply of due process safeguards recognized in Gault and
other decisions necessarily diminished when the state holds the child in its cus-
tody?217  Have we, as the title of this Symposium suggests, revived the view of
childhood in which the condition of being a child justifies a kangaroo court?
IV. POST-GA ULT VIEWS OF SHACKLING
A. Post-Gault Case Law
Although Gault holds that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees fundamental
protections for children in juvenile proceedings, "[t]he problem is to ascertain the
around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial
dignity, will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his work. Id.
213. Feld, supra note 159, at 350. Professor Feld faults Gault for providing children with the worst of both
the juvenile court and criminal court worlds: "Delinquents, then and now, continue to receive the 'worst of both
worlds,' neither the care and treatment juvenile courts promise for children nor the criminal procedural rights
provided adults." Id. See also Elizabeth Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmen-
tal Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 141-53 (1997) (discussing re-
forms in juvenile court policy in the wake of Gault).
214. As Professor Lois Weithom writes in concluding her study of systemic reform in the juvenile justice
and other child-treatment systems:
Returning to the proverb with which I began this Article-'plus 9a change, plus c'est la
m~me chose'-much has changed over this century in our nation's responses to troubled
and troublesome youth, and yet, much has stayed the same. Despite many cycles of reform
aimed at the mental health, juvenile justice, and child welfare systems, we have not yet
achieved most of the underlying goals articulated by these reform movements.
Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Troubled and Troublesome
Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1305, 1505 (2005).
215. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (rejecting constitutional challenge to Georgia civil
commitment scheme that authorized parents to involuntarily commit minors under the age of eighteen, stressing
that "[m]ost children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many deci-
sions ...."); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (identifying three factors that distinguish children's
constitutional rights from those enjoyed by adults: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing").
216. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
217. As DJJ argues, the statutory authority conferred on it to securely detain children deemed a risk to
public safety for up to twenty-one days pending trial, provides it with the legal authority to hold these children in
restraints at all appearances before the court during this statutory time period. Once the child is released prior to
adjudication, and therefore no longer in the custody of DJJ, its authority to shackle at all court appearances van-
ishes. This creates an irrational double standard in which children in state custody are shackled while those re-
leased from custody prior to trial appear in court without shackles. See supra Part U.B.
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precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings. 21 8 In addi-
tion to those basic constitutional protections for adults accused of crimes that the
Supreme Court has held applicable to juveniles in the Gault decision (viz., the
rights to notice, to counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and to invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination), the Court has held that in juvenile proceedings the state
must prove allegations beyond a reasonable doubt2 19 and the protection against
double jeopardy applies to children in delinquency proceedings.220 But the Court
has also made clear that the Constitution does not mandate the elimination of all
differences in the treatment of children. For example, the right to jury trial is ab-
sent from juvenile court proceedings, 221 and the Due Process Clause does not pro-
hibit pretrial detention of children deemed to be "serious risks" to public safety.222
Moreover, juvenile curfews and other forms of liberty restriction have been upheld
as constitutional in many federal circuits.223 Similarly, under the guise of parens
patriae, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of regulations promulgated by
the federal government that deny unaccompanied alien children in its custody the
right to an individual hearing to decide whether to release the child to the custody
of a person other than the child's parent or a close relative, even though the policy
restricts the child's physical liberty and consigns the child to institutional confine-
ment.224
The state has "a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the wel-
fare of the child,, 225 which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different
from an adult criminal trial. The Supreme Court has attempted, therefore, to rec-
oncile these different approaches by balancing the "informality" and "flexibility"
that characterize juvenile proceedings 226 while seeking to ensure that these proceed-
ings comport with the fundamental fairness required by the Due Process Clause.227
Indiscriminate shackling of juveniles based only on courtroom security consid-
erations to the exclusion of the important liberty interest at stake thus raises the
question of whether it is compatible with the "fundamental fairness" required by
due process. Two corollary inquiries are thus necessary to answer this question.228
218. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13-14.
219. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
220. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
221. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
222. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
223. See, e.g., Note, Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion Over Minor Rights, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2400 (2005); Calvin Massey, Juvenile Curfews and Fundamental Rights Methodology, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
775 (2000); Brian Prevor, Dusk 'Til Dawn: Children's Rights and the Effectiveness of Juvenile Curfew Ordi-
nances, 79 B.U. L. REv. 415 (1999).
224. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993). Notably, however, Justice Scalia (and concurring Justice
O'Connor), acknowledged that shackling or handcuffing a child implicates a more grave liberty interest that at
least implicitly mandates heightened judicial scrutiny: "The 'freedom from physical restraint' invoked by respon-
dents is not at issue in this case. Surely not in the sense of shackles, chains, or barred cells .... Id. at 302; see
also O'Connor concurrence: "A child's placement in this kind of governmental institution is hardly the same as
handcuffing her, confining her to a cell, yet it must still satisfy heightened constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 317-18.
225. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982). See also Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622 (restricting adolescent
medical decision-making in abortion context).
226. Winship, 397 U.S. at 366.
227. Breed, 421 U.S. at 531; McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543 (plurality opinion).
228. Schall, 467 U.S. at 263-64.
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First, does shackling serve a legitimate state objective? 229 Second, are the proce-
dural safeguards employed by the state and the court adequate to authorize the
blanket policy of shackling securely detained children charged with delinquent
offenses?
230
The state and the judiciary assuredly have an interest in maintaining the dignity
and decorum of the courtroom and in ensuring the safety of all present in the court-
room.231 Children's countervailing interests to be free from unwarranted restraint,
and to be treated with dignity and respect by the court in a manner that promotes
their amenability to rehabilitation, are substantial as well.232 But how qualified are
children's constitutional interests in light of the recognition that children, "unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody?" 233 Children, we are told, by definition
are "not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are as-
sumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters,
the State must play its part as parens patriae.234  As observed by Justice
Rehnquist: "In this respect, the juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, be subordinated to the State's 'parens patriae interest in preserving
and promoting the welfare of the child.'' 235
However, the state's parens patriae interest cannot completely override the
child's due process interests. A crucial distinction exists between present-day
blanket shackling policies and the individualized pretrial detention practices that
the Supreme Court approved in Schall v. Martin. Schall reviewed the facial consti-
tutionality of an elaborate New York statutory scheme that contained a standard for
the pretrial detention of juvenile offenders in whichjudges (not DJJ officials) were
given a risk assessment calculus focusing on the child's propensity for serious dan-
gerousness as a basis to order pretrial detention. By contrast, the de facto unwritten
shackling policies used in Florida's courtrooms contain no such dangerousness
standard for judges to apply and are based almost entirely on judicial deference to
DJJ's unreliable risk assessment instrument.
2 36
229. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (requiring defendant in a criminal case to appear
before jury in prison garb furthers no essential state interest).
230. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975);
Schall, 467 U.S. at 264; Reno, 507 U.S. 292.
231. As the Supreme Court observed in Deck:
There will be cases, of course, where these perils of shackling are unavoidable. We do not
underestimate the need to restrain dangerous defendants to prevent courtroom attacks, or the
need to give trial courts latitude in making individualized security determinations. We are
mindful of the tragedy that can result if judges are not able to protect themselves and their
courtrooms.
Deck, 544 U.S. at 632.
232. Melton, supra note 205, at 167-72.
233. Schall, 467 U.S. at 265.
234. Id. at 265.
235. Id. (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S at 766).
236. Schall, 467 U.S. at 255, 263-64. See also John A. Washington, Note, Preventive Detention: Danger-
ous Until Proven Innocent, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 271 (1988) (commenting on inherent inconsistencies between
varying methods used to determine dangerousness).
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Because the Florida shackling policy is devoid of a written statutory standard,
and lacks any duly promulgated administrative guidelines for the court to use in
ascertaining whether a child is dangerous or presents a concrete, identifiable risk
sufficient to warrant being shackled, the judge exercises virtually unbridled discre-
tion. Having no need to make individualized determinations of dangerousness or
risk of absconding, the court is unrestrained by any constitutional limits.
237
Notably, however, the primary reason the Supreme Court has given children
fewer procedural rights than those enjoyed by adult criminal defendants is to allow
for flexibility in the proceedings, and to protect and rehabilitate the child.238  A
blanket shackling policy accomplishes neither. It inflexibly denies children the
same rights of adult criminal defendants to appear in court without shackles and
denies them the informality and protection so essential to the integrity and mission
of the juvenile court process.
B. Due Process Considerations
It is axiomatic that a government agency may not exercise authority not dele-
gated to it by the legislature and, when the agency purports to have authority that
infringes on a constitutionally protected fundamental right, the Supreme Court has
insisted upon an explicit legislative expression of that authority.239 In Kent v. Dul-
les,240 the Court invoked the delegation doctrine to overturn an agency's authority
under regulations promulgated pursuant to broad congressional delegation in a fed-
eral statute to deny a passport to a member of the Communist Party. In doing so, it
declined to "find in this broad generalized power an authority to trench so heavily
on the rights of a citizen.",24' Thus, when an agency asserts an "unbridled discre-
tion" to act in a constitutionally questionable manner pursuant to broad legislative
authority containing inadequate standards, a court should construe narrowly all
delegated powers that curtail or dilute constitutionally-protected rights and find that
the agency's action infringing on those rights is ultra vires and null and void.
When the state and the court place children in mechanical restraints, the child's
fundamental right to be free from external physical restraint and other forms of
institutional confinement is more at stake than in any other liberty-deprivation con-
237. Contrary to the DJJ arguments that the risk assessment instrument filled out and scored by a juvenile
probation officer is a valid and conclusive predictor of dangerousness, and that a judicial process is therefore
superfluous, the restrictions on the child's liberty in the shackling context are far more severe than the deprivations
of liberty in the secure detention context and thus the procedural and substantive due process protections accorded
the child must be paramount. See, e.g., Reno, 507 U.S. at 302, 317-18.
Moreover, DJJ's willing compliance with court orders to remove shackles is an example of cognitive
dissonance: on the one hand it arrogates to itself unassailable expertise about the dangers posed by children placed
in secure detention (by virtue of the detention risk assessment instrument); on the other hand it concedes the valid-
ity of the court's individualized findings of no danger to public safety when the court orders DJJ to remove the
restraints.
238. See, e.g., McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 ("There is a possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if required as a
matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversarial process and will put
an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding.").
239. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 105-14 (1976).
240. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)
241. Id. at 129.
Vol. 9
Unchain the Children
text.242 As described above, there is a void in the legislative scheme regarding the
use of shackles in the courtroom. The Florida legislature has not explicitly author-
ized DJJ to enact a blanket policy of shackling all juveniles in the courtroom, but
DJJ nonetheless has asserted that it has the right to do so subject to any constraints
imposed by a judge.243
In fact, the Florida legislature authorizes DJJ to utilize mechanical restraints
and other similarly restrictive forms of discipline in two circumscribed contexts:
first, in carrying out disciplinary treatment of children as part of its responsibility to
administer a system of detention services for children under the legislatively-
created "juvenile justice continuum;"'244 second, as part of the agency's responsibil-
ity to have a "protective action response policy" governing "the use of verbal and
physical intervention techniques, mechanical restraints, aerosol and chemical
agents, and Tasers by employees" in detention facilities, delinquency programs, or
commitment programs operated by DJJ or its contract providers.245
Pursuant to these limited grants of legislative authority, DJJ has promulgated
rules that govern the discipline of youth in DJJ detention facilities and programs.
The rules provide for the use of a "behavior management system" that meets the
needs of the youth and the facility, explicitly prohibit the use of corporal punish-
ment and drugs to control behavior of youth in the facility and expressly limit the
use of restrictive behavior controls such as mechanical restraints and confinement.
For example, the agency's regulations provide that mechanical restraints "shall be
used as a method of controlling youth who present a threat to safety and security
within the facility., 246 The regulations require the use of mechanical restraints
when transporting youth "outside the secure area of the facility. '247 In the clearest
statement of the agency's own limitations on the use of restraints, they expressly
prohibit the blanket use of mechanical restraints in its facilities as "a form of disci-
pline., 248 DJJ authority to use mechanical restraints is thus confined to the control
of youth who present a threat to safety and security within secure detention facili-
242. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992); see also Reno, 507 U.S. at 318 (O'Connor, J.
concurring) ("Just as it is true that 'in our society liberty [for adults] is the norm, and detention prior to trial or
without trial is the carefully limited exception,' . . . so too, in our society, children grow up in families, not in
governmental institutions .... ) (citations omitted).
243. See supra Part lI.B.
244. FLA. STAT. § 985.601(9) (2007).
245. FLA. STAT. § 985.645 (2007).
246. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 63G-2.012(3)(a) (2007) (emphasis added).
247. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 63G-2.012(3)(b) (2007). As a further accountability check on the use of
restraints in facilities, R. 63G-2.012(3)(d), requires that "[w]henever mechanical restraints are used, a report shall
be completed and submitted for review," except when restraints are used to transport youth outside the secure area
of the facility.
248. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 63G-2.012(3)(c) (2007). In addition to its published rules, DJJ has pub-
lished extensive and detailed agency policies and procedures governing the use of restraints in facilities and during
transportation. See, e.g., FLA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, PROTECTIVE ACTION
RESPONSE (PAR) POLICY, § FDJJ-1508-03(Il)(C)(3) (revised 08/15/03); FLA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, STATEWIDE TRANSPORTATION OFFENDER POLICY (STOP), § FDJJ-5000(II)(C)(4)
(revised 05/25/04); DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 2006 DETENTION SERVICES MANUAL, CHAPTER 8.
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ties, and to situations when it transports youth outside secure facilities, but the
agency's authority to use mechanical restraints ends at the courthouse door.
249
In addition to exceeding its delegated statutory authority, DJJ has failed to
comply with statutory rulemaking requirements under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act prior to adopting its blanket policies governing the shackling of juveniles
in the courtroom. The legislature has made it plain that "[r]ulemaking is not a mat-
ter of agency discretion. Each agency statement defined as a rule under section
120.52 shall be adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided by this section as
soon as feasible and practicable., 250 Section 120.52 (15) provides in part:
"Rule" means each agency statement of general applicability that
implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the
procedure or practice requirements of an agency and includes any
form which imposes any requirement or solicits any information
not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule.25'
The blanket shackling policy in force throughout Florida is of general applicability
and therefore a "rule" as defined by this provision.
By applying this policy without first following the statutorily required rule-
making procedures, 25 2 DJJ has exceeded its delegated authority.253 Because DJJ
has not followed the rulemaking procedure in fashioning its unwritten blanket
shackling policy, that policy is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative author-
ity.
2 54
While DJJ has written agency protocols regarding the use of mechanical re-
straints in DJJ detention facilities and for transportation of juvenile offenders be-
tween secure facilities, there is no such policy on conditions inside a courtroom.
255
The only written reference to the court's role in overseeing the use of mechanical
restraints on juveniles in a courtroom appears in Chapter 8 of the Department of
Juvenile Justice 2006 Detention Services Manual, which states that "[t]he Judge
249. DJJ does not consider juvenile court as one of its "facilities." The department distinguishes between
what it defines as facilities and agencies involved in the juvenile justice continuum. In the DJJ DETENTION SERV.
MANUAL, CHAPTER 2, SECTION XI INTERAGENCY AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, the distinction is made clear:
A. The facility shall maintain open lines of communication and shall meet and/or make con-
tact quarterly with representatives of agencies involved in the juvenile justice continuum,
including: 1. The juvenile court(s); 2. The State Attorney's Office; 3. The Public Defender's
Office; 4. Local law enforcement agencies; 5. School system; 6. Contracted programs /
agencies.
250. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(l)(a) (2007). See McDonald v. Dep't of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 580-81
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (policy statements of general applicability require rulemaking).
251. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(15) (2007).
252. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (2007).
253. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(a) (2007).
254. See Matthews v. Weinberg, 645 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services exceeded delegated authority by not following rulemaking procedures in fash-
ioning foster parent licensing policies excluding homosexuals and unmarried couples).
255. See supra Part ll.B.
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may request restraints be removed while the youth is in the courtroom. The youth
will be restrained upon leaving the courtroom and entering the courtroom. 25 6
However, this operational guideline is not a rule, and because it provides no
specific guidance as to how the court should exercise discretion in deciding
whether or not to remove restraints, it does not come close to the individualized
assessment of safety and security risk that DJJ's own regulations require it to make
before it uses mechanical restraints to control a youth or others in a secure deten-
tion facility. 257 Tellingly, it also lacks a constitutional standard to guide the judge
in exercising discretion with respect to the shackling or unshackling of offenders.
C. The Youngberg v. Romeo Professional Judgment Standard
Shackling involves intrusions on the historic, fundamental right to "[l]iberty
from bodily restraint," long recognized as "the core of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action., 258 As a result, courts
should apply a heightened level of scrutiny of a state's justifications for shackling
all juveniles in court regardless of their age, size, gender, pending charges, history
of violence, or risk of escape. In Youngberg v. Romeo,259 the Supreme Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a decision to
physically restrain a patient in a mental health facility for prolonged periods of the
day if the professionals' decision to use restraints amounted to "such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demon-
strate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such judg-
ment.
2 60
The court's practice entails the use of instruments of restraint, such as hand-
cuffs, chains, irons, or straightjackets, for hours or even entire days at a time261 on
many youths charged with nonviolent offenses, with no histories of disruptive
courtroom behavior, no court findings that restraints are necessary to prevent harm
to the child or another person, and with no consideration of less restrictive alterna-
tives to ensure security of the courtroom and its occupants. This practice arguably
constitutes a "substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice
or standards."
DJJ's blanket policy of courtroom shackling, and the judges' acquiescence in
that policy, violate the Youngberg professional judgment standard. DJJ uses, and
the court countenances, a blanket, across-the-board standard for using restraints in
the courtroom, irrespective of the child's age, size, gender, pending charges, his-
tory of violence, or risk of escape, in clear contrast to the "protective action re-
sponse policy" adopted pursuant to its delegated statutory authority, 262 for use in
256. See supra note 248.
257. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 63G-2.012(3)(a) (2007).
258. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
259. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
260. Id. at 323.
261. See discussion supra Part II.
262. See FLA. STAT. § 985.645 (2007).
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secure detention facilities. The response policy carefully details how the agency is
to exercise its professional judgment when using mechanical restraints in DJJ fa-
cilities and programs. It circumscribes the use of mechanical restraints in secure
detention facilities, limiting their use to "situations where a youth has initiated ac-
tive, combative, or aggravated resistance; and in situations where a youth poses a
physical threat to self, staff, or others. 263 In contrast, in the courtroom, DJJ asserts
free rein, immune from any standards and very little oversight by the judge, to use
restraints at will, even where the youth has initiated no aggravated resistance and
poses no physical threat to self or others.
Hence, the DJJ professional judgment standard regarding use of mechanical re-
straints, set forth in detail in DJJ's juvenile detention protocols, is violated by the
indiscriminate shackling practices deployed in the juvenile courtroom. 264
D. The Deck v. Missouri Standard
As analyzed above, considerations of due process require DJJ to bear the bur-
den of justifying to the trial court its use of restraints in the courtroom on an indi-
vidual, case-by-case basis. Thus, Youngberg requires DJJ to demonstrate that it has
used restraints in conformity with its own professional judgment standard. Addi-
tionally, placing the burden on DJJ is mandated under Deck v. Missouri, which
held that a capital defendant must be unshackled at the penalty phase of the trial,
unless the state can show the court that the use of restraints is "justified by an es-
sential state interest"--such as courtroom security-specific to any danger posed
by the individual defendant.265
In Deck, the Supreme Court cited three reasons to require the state to justify the
need to shackle a convicted defendant at the penalty phase of a capital proceeding,
all of which are a fortiori relevant to shackled juveniles who are subjected to
shackling even at pre-adjudicatory court appearances. First, "the appearance of the
offender in the penalty phase in shackles... almost inevitably implies to a jury, as
a matter of common sense, that court authorities consider the offender a danger to
263. FLA DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, PROTECTIVE ACTION RESPONSE (PAR)
POLICY, § FDJJ-1508-03(Il)(C)(3), supra note 248, at 3. Indeed, the thirty-one page Protective Action Response
Policy contains a detailed (over seventeen page) description of the protocols for use of handcuffs, restraint belts,
leg cuffs, restraint chairs, soft restraints, and waist chains in "Level 3 Response" situations, and training for staff to
use in subduing a youth who initiates active, combative, or aggravated resistance, or who poses a physical threat to
self or others. This detailed protocol, designed to ensure stringent accountability measures for the use of mechani-
cal restraints to "establish and maintain safe environments for staff and youth," "ensure public safety," "provide
for order and discipline," and ensure that Level 3 [mechanical restraints] responses are "used as a last resort," id. at
1, illustrates the glaring absence of guidance for the exercise of professional judgment in the use of restraints by
DJJ in the courtroom.
264. Cf Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdication Under the
Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 703-704 (1992) (criticizing reliance on the Youngberg pro-
fessional judgment standard in a number of different institutional contexts (psychiatric hospitals, higher education,
juvenile justice, prisons and jails, foster care, effective assistance of counsel, etc.), and in particular to defend the
use of isolation and restraint and other "intrusive practices designed to control children in the juvenile justice
system.").
265. Deck, 544 U.S. at 624 (quoting Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 560).
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the community., 26 6 Second, "[s]hackles can interfere with the accused's 'ability to
communicate' with his lawyer.' '267 And third, "the use of shackles at trial 'af-
front[s]' the 'dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking
to uphold.' '268 In holding that the defendant's due process rights were violated
when he appeared at sentencing in leg irons, handcuffs, and a belly chain, the Court
set forth precisely the individualized judicial fact-finding and risk assessment bal-
ancing process that also should apply to juveniles who have not yet been adjudi-
cated delinquent but routinely appear in shackles and other restraints before the
court:
[W]e must conclude that courts cannot routinely place defendants
in shackles or other restraints visible to the jury during the penalty
phase of a capital proceeding. The constitutional requirement,
however, is not absolute. It permits a judge, in the exercise of his
or her discretion, to take account of special circumstances, includ-
ing security concerns, that may call for shackling. In so doing, it
accommodates the important need to protect the courtroom and its
occupants. But any such determination must be case specific; that
is to say, it should reflect particular concerns, say, special security
needs or escape risks, related to the defendant on trial.269
If an adult defendant, convicted by a jury of double murder and robbery, is en-
titled to a rebuttable presumption that he will not appear shackled before the court,
should a child charged with a nonviolent offense and no history of disruptive court-
room behavior be entitled to any less protection? Although Florida statutory law
disallows an unwritten, across-the-board policy of shackling every juvenile of-
fender who appears in the courtroom in these hearings, DJJ and court shackling
policies also violate the child's right to be free from external restraint, and due
process requires an individualized determination of dangerousness and a finding
that there are no less restrictive alternatives before requiring the juvenile to be re-
strained in court.2 70
E. Incorporating Social Science Research Into Due Process Analysis
In applying Deck to the routine practice of shackling alleged juvenile offend-
ers, it is also important to incorporate social science research about adolescents,
and their unique developmental needs and responses to incarceration and rehabili-
tation, into the due process analysis. An example, pre-dating Deck and Youngberg,
266. Deck, 544 U.S. at 633.
267. Id. at 631.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 633.
270. See generally Weithom supra note 214, at 1417-25. Professor Weithom specifically notes that "[t]he
view that there is, or should be, a constitutional right to the least restrictive alternative when restrictions of physi-
cal liberty are implicated is grounded in application of that mode of constitutional analysis that requires strict
scrutiny of policies that impair fundamental rights." Id. at 1417.
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is illustrated by Pena v. New York State Division for Youth.27 1 In Pena, Judge Mot-
ley scrutinized the constitutional and statutory claims of juveniles subjected to in-
discriminate shackling, among other forms of restrictive and intrusive disciplinary
measures, while housed in New York youth correctional facilities. In holding that
the use of isolation, as well as physical and chemical restraints to control their be-
havior had violated the children's due process rights to rehabilitative treatment,
Judge Motley found that their use "should be tolerated only in cases where a child
is a serious and evident danger to himself or others and incapable of being con-
trolled by any less restrictive means. 272
The court identified rare instances when shackling might be necessary, such as
short-term transportation from one institution to another, and limited the use of
physical restraints to no more than thirty minutes, except in the instance of "ve-
hicular transportation" where their utilization is "necessary for public safety. 2 73
The court found that the constitutional violations were also contrary to the rehabili-
tative purposes of commitment of the juveniles to the facilities, and thus held that
the shackling practices were "punitive and anti-therapeutic and therefore unconsti-
tutional. 274
The court analyzed the children's substantive due process right to rehabilitative
treatment 275 informed by clinical insights into the anti-therapeutic consequences of
the practices in the facility's institutional milieu.2 76 In effect, the court scrutinized
the constitutional interests of the children through a social science lens, assessing
their constitutional rights within a normative framework that incorporated current
scientific knowledge about the rehabilitative and anti-rehabilitative consequences
of the practices into the legal rights analysis.
Contemporary policy concerning youth transitioning to adulthood continues to
demand social science and other research data from a variety of disciplines to in-
form the juvenile justice system's responses to the problems of youth crime. The
MacArthur Research Network on Transitions to Adulthood and Public Policy
277
and current research about adolescent crime, in particular research on correctional
271. Pena v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
272. Id. at 211.
273. Id. at 210. In contrast to the New York restraint and seclusion practices declared unconstitutional in
Pena, the Florida shackling policy permits the chaining of children to furniture, doors or other fixed structures in
the courtroom to keep them in place for up to four hours. These practices are carried out without any individual-
ized findings of dangerousness, and none of the broad public safety considerations attendant to vehicular transpor-
tation or risk of flight.
274. Id. at 207.
275. Id. at 206 (analyzing the due process rights of juveniles under Supreme Court case law to deduce a
constitutionally-grounded right to rehabilitative treatment, a parens patriae prohibition against punishment and
retribution, and treatment modalities consistent with the juvenile justice system's goal to provide "guidance and
rehabilitation for the child ... not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment." (quoting Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966))).
276. Id. at 207 ("As the science of treatment in such cases matures, one can expect new insights as to effec-
tive therapy and, in turn, new parameters.").
277. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Keynote Address: Vulnerable Youth and the Transition to Adulthood, Sympo-
sium: Law and Adolescence: The Legal Status, Rights, and Responsibilities of Adolescents in the Child Welfare,
Juvenile, and Criminal Justice Systems, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 325, 325 (2006). For more information about the Mac-
Arthur Research Network, see http://www.transad.pop.upenn.edu.
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practices such as the use of restraints in disciplining incarcerated youth, 278 demon-
strate "why a legal regime that is grounded in scientific knowledge about adoles-
cence and the role of criminal activity during this developmental period is better
for young offenders and for society than the contemporary policy, which often pays
little attention to differences between adolescents and adults."
279
Research on the effects of shackling children in the delinquency system, in-
cluding children with disabilities,280 girls,28' and minority youth282 is especially
278. See COMM. ON LAW AND JUSTICE ET AL., JUVENILE CRIME JUVENILE JUSTICE (Joan McCord et al.,
eds., 2001) (recommending study by the federal government and the states in "evaluating the effects of correc-
tional policies and practices such as the use of behavior modification programs, physical restraints and isolation
on incarcerated juveniles" (emphasis added)).
279. Elizabeth S. Scott, Keynote Address: Adolescence and the Regulation of Youth Crime, Symposium: Law
and Adolescence: The Legal Status, Rights, and Responsibilities ofAdolescents in the Child Welfare, Juvenile, and
Criminal Justice Systems, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 337, 337 (2006).
280. As Dr. Beyer detailed in her affidavit, supra Part II.D.2, detained children suffer from depression,
attention and conduct disorders, and substance abuse. She opined that shackling exacerbates trauma, reviving
feelings of powerlessness, betrayal and self-blame. She added that shackling a victim of physical or sexual abuse,
where restraint was part of the abuse, could trigger flashbacks and reinforce early feelings of powerlessness.
Beyer Affidavit, supra note 98 at 7.
See also Beyer, supra note 197 at 1215 ("Court procedures and attorney-client relationships in depend-
ency and delinquency hearings would be designed differently if we stood in the child's shoes: because of the
effects of trauma, disabilities, and childish thinking, children and teenagers are significantly compromised in the
relationships that are crucial for them to develop normally."); Teplin, supra note 102 at 1 (observing that few
epidemiological studies regarding psychiatric disorders of juvenile detainees exist, and cautioning that without
sound data on the prevalence of psychiatric disorders, "defining the best strategies to use and allocating the juve-
nile justice system's scarce mental health resources are difficult").
281. A 2005 study by the Florida Office of Program Policy Analysis and Governmental Accountability
(OPPAGA) reported in 2005 that 94% of the ninety girls in residential facilities studied had a diagnosed mental
health problem and 68% of the girls reported that they had suffered past neglect, physical or sexual abuse. See
OPPAGA, GENDER-SPECIFIC SERVICES FOR DELINQUENT GIRLS VARY ACROSS PROGRAMS, BUT HELP REDUCE
RECIDIVISM (Report No. 05-13) (2005).
Shackling girls with histories of sexual abuse and serious mental health diagnoses is known to exacer-
bate serious underlying illnesses and disorders. See Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syn-
drome, Psychiatric Labeling and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1271, 1274 (1994).
An enormous proportion of women in mental institutions have suffered from sexual abuse and vio-
lence. And when women who have been raped and sexually abused are institutionalized, the 'treatment' they
receive fails to address the connection between past abuse and present behavior such as anorexia, self-mutilation,
severe depression, and attempts at suicide. Instead, institutional conditions and treatment replicate and exacerbate
the pain of the original assaults and abuse, often leaving women patients in a condition that fulfills the prophecy of
their pathology. Id.
282. With respect to racial impact ofjuvenile justice detention policy nationally and in Florida, the National
Juvenile Defender Center report observed:
The disproportionate confinement of youth who are members of racial and ethnic minorities
is a disturbing nationwide phenomenon. Disproportionality exists at striking levels despite
the fact that the offense profiles of youth in the juvenile justice system do not vary substan-
tially by race and ethnicity. Nationwide, African American youth are more likely than
white youth to be formally charged in juvenile court, even when referred to court for the
same type of delinquent act. Detention rates for African American youth exceed the rates
for white youth within every offense category. Florida is no exception to this stark picture.
African American youth are 45% of the detainees in Florida's secure facilities, although
they are only 22% of the youth population. FLORIDA-AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL, supra note 14, at 59 (citations omitted).
As Dr. Beyer opined in her affidavit, the practice of shackling detained youth is especially severe to children of
color, who may associate the practice with racism, even if the practice is universal. Beyer Affidavit, supra Part
II.D.2, 12. This observation is particularly compelling from both clinical and historical standpoints, given the
legacy of African American servitude on brutal chain gangs throughout Florida and the South, and the obvious
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important, because of its potential to damage these already vulnerable populations
through practices whose effects are as yet unknown and that may be ultimately
found to be seriously anti-therapeutic. Ethical canons governing research subject
experimentation, particularly in the child and prisoner experiment contexts, are
necessarily implicated.283 At a very minimum, the views of those children who
have been subjected to the shackling practices should be elicited 284 and analyzed so
that the detrimental effects of shackling on children are better understood by judges
and policymakers.
Additionally, given the dearth of local or national research data on the inci-
dence of juvenile-perpetrated courtroom violence, court policy regarding shackling
should be informed by systematic research analyzing and gauging the actual (not
just anecdotal or perceived) threats of juveniles to courthouse safety. Organiza-
tions such as the American Bar Association and the National Council of Juvenile
and Family Court Judges should spearhead this study and develop standards for use
by juvenile courts and other stakeholders to assist in their efforts to improve prac-
tice in this area.285 Juvenile courts have a historical and moral obligation to lead in
crafting knowledge-based solutions rather than abdicating to narrow institutional
interests of stakeholders uninformed by data and research that result in policies
contrary to the profession's "best practices" and to the children's best interests.286
analogies between the dehumanizing treatment of convicts on chain gangs and shackled juveniles. See Lisa Kel-
ley, Chain Gangs, Boogeymen and Other Real Prisons of the Imagination, 5 RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 1 (1999)
(presenting a "fictionalized account of real legal, historical, and interpersonal issues rooted in the social construc-
tion of race," through chain gang narratives).
283. See, e.g., THE NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN 1-26, 91-121 (1977) (describing
research methodology recommendations and discussing appropriate ethical standards for scientific study involving
children as research subjects); DENNIS M. MALONEY, PROTECTION OF HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS (1984) 343-49 (discussing research protocols for pris-
oner research in HHS and FDA-funded studies).
284. See Winick & Cortada, supra note 2 (describing Voice Project).
285. Although the National Council's Juvenile Delinquency Guidelines contain recommendations for court
security measures designed to provide guidance to delinquency court and law enforcement staff, the Council has
not yet developed a shackling policy. The security measures that it has developed recommend, among other
procedures, security screenings upon entering the court building, alarm buzzers in the courtroom to access security
assistance outside the courtroom, adequate security staff inside the courtroom, and emergency response plans. See
NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, 32, available
at http://www.ncjfcj.org/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
The current National Council President, Judge Dale Koch, supports restrictions on the indiscriminate
use of shackles in the courtroom as a security measure. As quoted in a recent USA Today story on this topic,
Judge Koch favors a presumption against shackling, making its use the exception rather than the rule in juvenile
court practice: "My experience has been that [shackling] can be done safely, as long as you have an exception
built in where you can decide that under circumstances of that youth, they need to be shackled ... It is just more
respectful to not have the kids shackled while they're.., in front of the judge." Moore, supra note 6.
286. See Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1993 (1993):
Not only does the juvenile court have a history of being at the center of the child and family
service system, but the role of moral leadership, especially on behalf of disadvantaged
groups, is at the heart of some visions of the judiciary in general. At its best, the judicial
system educates the citizenry in the core social values and their significance for everyday
life. Most fundamentally, the courts have the responsibility and the authority to ensure that
public agencies act in children's best interest. Id. at 2040-41(citations omitted).
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Juvenile court policies governing this practice should also be informed by what
is already known about the adverse and co-morbidity effects of using physical re-
straints in other settings, such as psychiatric institutions,287 before they implement
policies that may have potentially devastating medical and psychological (and even
fatal288) consequences for these children.
Incorporating social science and other research into juvenile justice practice in
formulating policy on the use of restraints in the courtroom is supported by federal
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations governing physical
and chemical restraints on children, adolescents, and adults in state and local men-
tal health facilities. These regulations were developed in response to "the danger
posed to residents in psychiatric residential treatment facilities as a result of im-
proper restraint" practices upon children and adolescents.289 They demonstrate the
importance of carefully regulating the use of shackles in the courtroom, and why
these practices need to be developed with the goal of fostering, rather than hinder-
ing, the child's amenability to rehabilitation.290 The HHS standards exemplify "best
287. The research literature on adverse effects of restraints in psychiatric settings is considerable, and it
overwhelmingly shows a need to circumscribe the use of physical and other forms of restraint as an accepted
intervention in the therapeutic milieu. See, e.g., David M. Day, Examining the Therapeutic Utility of Restraints
and Seclusion With Children and Youth: The Role of Theory and Research in Practice, 72 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 266 (2002); Kathleen R. Delaney & Louis Fogg, Patient Characteristics and Setting Vari-
ables Related to the Use of Restraints on Four Inpatient Psychiatric Units for Youths, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES
186 (2005); William A. Fischer, Restraint and Seclusion: A Review of the Literature, 151 (11) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1584 (1994); Sheila S. Kennedy & Wanda K. Mohr, A Prolegomenon on Restraint of Children, 71 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 26 (2001); Brian D. Leity et al., Review of Restraint Data in a Residential Treatment Center
for Adolescent Females, 35 CHILD YOUTH CARE FORUM 339 (2006); Derek Miller et al., Use of a Holding Tech-
nique to Control the Violent Behavior of Seriously Disturbed Adolescents, 40 HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 520 (1989); Wanda K. Mohr et al., A Restraint on Restraints: The Need to Reconsider the Use of
Restrictive Interventions, 12 ARCHIVES OF PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 95 (1998); Wanda K. Mohr et al., Adverse
Effects Associated With Physical Restraint, 48 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 330 (2003); Louise Nelstrop et al., A
Systematic Review of the Safety and Effectiveness of Restraint and Seclusion as Interventions for the Short-Term
Management of Violence in Adult Psychiatric Inpatient Settings and Emergency Departments, in 3 WORLDVIEWS
ON EVIDENCE-BASED NURSING 8 (2006); Michael A. Nunno et al., Learning From Tragedy: A Survey of Child
and Adolescent Restraint Fatalities, 30 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1333 (2006); A. Sourander et al., Use of Hold-
ing, Restraints, Seclusion, and Time-Out in Child and Adolescent Psychiatric In-Patient Treatment, 11(4)
EUROPEAN CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 162 (2002); George M. Schreiner et al., Decreasing the Use of
Mechanical Restraints and Locked Seclusion, 31 ADMIN. AND POL'Y IN MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL HEALTH
RESEARCH 449 (2004); Loma K.P. Suen et al., Use of Physical Restraints in Rehabilitation Settings: Staff Knowl-
edge, Attitudes and Predictors, 55 JOURNAL OF ADVANCED NURSING 20 (2006); J. Carole Taxis, Ethics and
Praxis: Alternative Strategies to Physical Restraint and Seclusion in a Psychiatric Setting, 23 ISSUES IN MENTAL
HEALTH NURSING 157 (2002).
288. See, e.g., Cassi Feldman, State Facilities' Use of Force is Scrutinized After Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2007, at A22 (reporting that death of a juvenile in state-run rehabilitation center in New York state "refocused
attention on the use of physical restraint in state youth facilities").
289. Medicaid Program: Use of Restraint and Seclusion in Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facilities
Providing Psychiatric Services to Individuals Under Age 21, 66 Fed. Reg. 7148 (Background) (Jan. 22, 2001) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 441 and 483).
290. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)(2007) ("All patients have the right to be free from restraint or seclu-
sion, of any form imposed as a means of coercion, discipline, convenience, or retaliation by staff."); 42 C.F.R. §
482.13(e)(2) (stating that restraints on patients should "only be used when less restrictive interventions have been
determined ineffective to protect the patient, a staff member or others from harm"); 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)(3)(8)(i)-
(iii) (requiring that use of restraints be done pursuant to order of physician, but prohibiting standing or "as needed"
orders, recommending consultation with the treating physician if ordered by a non-treating doctor, in accordance
with a written modification to patient's treatment plan, implemented in the least restrictive manner possible, in
accordance with safe and appropriate restraining techniques, and ended at the earliest possible time); 42 C.F.R. §
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practices" in the use of restraints to control patients (particularly children and ado-
lescents) in psychiatric facilities. By contrast, the unbridled and indiscriminate use
of mechanical restraints upon children and adolescents in the courtroom, without
any consideration of less restrictive alternatives, any checks on the use of restraints
to situations involving an immediate risk of safety to the juvenile or others, and any
durational limits, is, at best, arbitrary and capricious, and at worst, egregiously anti-
therapeutic and potentially seriously harmful to children.
The need for procedural due process standards to establish factually and legally
grounded bases for the decision to shackle a child is critical both to the integrity of
the process as well as to the therapeutic goals that are so essential to the function-
ing and mission of the juvenile justice system itself.2 91 Indeed, the central purposes
of the Florida juvenile justice system are:
To ensure the protection of society, by providing for a comprehen-
sive standardized assessment of the child's needs so that the most
appropriate control, discipline, punishment, and treatment can be
administered consistent with the seriousness of the act committed,
the community's long-term need for public safety, the prior record
of the child, and the specific rehabilitative needs of the child...
A blanket courtroom shackling policy that fails to take any of these factors into
account, on an individual basis, is antithetical to these key purposes of the Florida
juvenile justice system.
V. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERATIONS
Consistent with this analysis, considerations of therapeutic jurisprudence
strongly argue against a blanket policy of shackling juveniles in court. Therapeutic
jurisprudence is a field of social inquiry with a law reform agenda that studies the
ways in which legal rules, procedures, and the roles of legal actors produce thera-
peutic or anti-therapeutic consequences for those affected by the legal process.293
482.13(0(2) (cautioning that restraints "can only be used in emergency situations if needed to ensure the patient's
physical safety and less restrictive interventions have been determined to be ineffective"); 42 C.F.R. §
482.13(f)(3)(a) (prohibiting the use of standing orders for restraint); 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)(8)(i)(B)-(C) (limiting
the duration of restraint to two hours for children and adolescents ages nine through seventeen, or one hour for
patients under age nine).
291. See Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908, 927 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (use of seclusion or restraint in a
psychiatric facility constitutionally may be used as a form of institutional discipline for infraction of ward rules, at
least for dangerous patients housed in a forensic unit, but in such cases there must be a formal hearing, including
written notice of the alleged violation, a written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied upon and the
reasons for the disciplinary action, and the opportunity to call witnesses and present other evidence in defense).
292. FLA. STAT. § 985.01(1)(c) (2007).
293. See generally BRUCE WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005);
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (Bruce J. Winick and David B.
Wexler, eds., 2003); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B.
Wexler and Bruce J. Winick, eds., 1996).
As described supra note 96, the author of this article and Bruce Winick submitted a therapeutic juris-
prudence affidavit in the Miami-Dade, Palm Beach and other Florida cases. The affidavit was also used in similar
litigation filed in California, North Carolina, and New Mexico. See, e.g., Tiffany A., 59 Cal.Rptr.3d at 368 n. 7
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Therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to promote policies, systems, and relationships
consistent with normative principles of justice and constitutional law, which will
secure positive therapeutic outcomes and minimize negative psychological and
behavioral effects of anti-therapeutic legal rules and practices.294 The principles of
therapeutic jurisprudence are especially germane to the juvenile court setting that
was designed to meet a rehabilitative agenda by which judges dispense an assort-
ment of therapeutic services to children who are victims of abuse or charged with
delinquent offenses.295
("[P]etitioner has also submitted new evidence supportive of her position-a declaration from two law professors
who stated the physical restraint policy is 'anti-therapeutic for juveniles, prejudicial to their obtaining a fair trial,
and antithetical to the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile justice system'.").
The author and Professor Winick also filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the University of Miami
School of Law's Children & Youth Law Clinic and Florida's Children First, Inc., in support of the petitioners in
R.C. v. Juvenile Court Judges, the habeas petition recently denied by Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal.
See discussion supra Part II.D.3. The amicus brief is the latest in a series of such briefs applying principles of
therapeutic jurisprudence to Florida juvenile court proceedings. See David B. Wexler, Lowering the Volume
Through Legal Doctrine: A Promising Path for Therapeutic Jurisprudence Scholarship, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 123,
133 (2002) (encouraging law schools to submit amicus curiae briefs utilizing therapeutic jurisprudence principles
to inform evolving legal doctrine) and cases and articles cited infra note 292.
294. Some therapeutic jurisprudence proponents question whether its approach is impoverished by its failure
to endorse a specific social science methodology for understanding the therapeutic (as opposed to anti-therapeutic)
consequences of legal rules and practices. See, e.g., Susan L. Brooks, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Build
Effective Relationships With Students, Clients and Communities, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 213, 216 n. 11 ("Until now,
therapeutic jurisprudence has neither embraced nor rejected any particular theoretical approach. Despite my
general enthusiasm for therapeutic jurisprudence, I find this aspect to be problematic. Because therapeutic juris-
prudence does not prescribe a particular normative framework, there is a genuine danger that many misguided
ideas and programs will be passed off as 'therapeutic'.").
Of course, therapeutic jurisprudence does not shun a normative viewpoint and it very much seeks
empirical study to test its assumptions. See, e.g., David B Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Culture of
Critique, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 263, 269 (1999) ("[T]herapeutic jurisprudence scholarship recognizes the
crucial importance of empirical inquiry to test the accuracy of its speculations."). Moreover, as discussed in Part
III.B supra, its aims very much coincide with research in the psychology of procedural justice, which demonstrates
that it relies heavily on empirical study to promote court procedures and practices that foster normative therapeutic
values and rehabilitative outcomes.
295. Therapeutic jurisprudence has been widely embraced by the Florida courts, especially in juvenile court
proceedings. See, e.g., In re Amendments to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.355, 952 So.2d 517
(Fla. 2007) (acknowledging therapeutic benefits to child of being heard in dependency court hearings on admini-
stration of psychotropic medication); Amendments to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350, 842
So.2d 763 (Fla. 2003) (adopting rule of juvenile procedure requiring appointment of counsel and hearings for
children objecting to placement in residential treatment); Amendment to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R.
Juv. P. 8.350, 804 So.2d 1206, 1210-11 (Fla. 2001) (expressly applying the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence
in the Florida Supreme Court's consideration of a rule of juvenile procedure requiring the court to consider the
child's views before ordering him or her into residential treatment); Amendment to the Rule of Juvenile Procedure,
Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.100(a), 796 So.2d. 470 (Fla. 2001) (acknowledging anti-therapeutic consequences to the child of
video detention hearings); M.W. v. Davis, 756 So.2d 90, 107 (Fla. 2001) (noting the psychological benefits to
juveniles from being afforded procedural protections prior to being placed in psychiatric treatment facilities); S.C.
v. Guardian ad Litem, 845 So.2d 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (utilizing therapeutic jurisprudence to uphold
child's right to invoke the psychotherapist-patient privilege to prevent court-appointed guardian ad litem from
gaining access to records covered by privilege).
See also Janet Gilbert et al., Applying Therapeutic Principles to a Family-Focused Juvenile Justice
Model (Delinquency), 52 ALA. L. REV. 1153 (2001); Barbara J. Pariente, Introduction, Symposium Issue: Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence in Clinical Legal Education and Legal Skills Training, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 403 (2005);
Perlmutter, supra note 2; Patricia Puritz and Katayoon Majd, Ensuring Authentic Youth Participation in Delin-
quency Cases: Creating a Paradigm for Specialized Juvenile Defense Practice, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 466, 476
(2007); Salisbury, supra note 2; Bruce J. Winick & Ginger Lerner Wren, Do Juveniles Facing Civil Commitment
Have a Right to Counsel?: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Brief 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 115 (2002).
Barry Law Review
Indiscriminate shackling brands and stigmatizes juvenile defendants in ways
that adversely affect how others regard them, and the manner in which they regard
themselves. This "self-fulfilling prophecy" effect is documented in the social psy-
chology and sociological literature.296 Labeling persons or otherwise treating them
in ways that convey to them a negative or discrediting message sets in motion
forces that lead them to behave in ways that conform to their ascribed roles. It
does so in two ways: first, it produces behavior in individuals observing the la-
beled person that causes them to act toward the person in a manner that confirms
the label's negative attributes; second, it causes the labeled individual to regard
himself differently, accepting the discrediting impact of the label and transforming
his identity in ways that subsequently cause him to act in accordance with the stig-
matizing label.
Shackling is a particularly pernicious form of labeling. It conveys the unmis-
takable message that the shackled individual is dangerous and violent, and must
have committed a serious crime. It conveys this message to the judge, the prosecu-
tor, and other court personnel. Shackling assigns labeled juveniles a spoiled iden-
tity: they are "bad" and "dangerous" people who must be restrained in the most
primitive way. They must thereby lack self-control. This is exactly the opposite
message the juvenile court would want to convey to adolescents struggling with
their identity who get into trouble with the law.
Lastly, as the Supreme Court observed in Deck, a routine policy of shackling
offends basic judicial notions of "formal dignity, which includes the respectful
treatment of defendants, reflects the importance of the matter at issue, guilt or in-
nocence, and the gravity with which Americans consider any deprivation of an
individual's liberty through criminal punishment., 297 This symbolic yet concrete
objective is no less important in a juvenile court proceeding than it is in a criminal
proceeding, both of which should aim to secure positive therapeutic outcomes and
minimize negative psychological and behavioral effects of anti-therapeutic legal
rules and practices.
VI. CONCLUSION
But the body is also directly involved in a political field; power re-
lations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train




296. See generally THOMAS J. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1966) (deviancy
labeling serves to marginalize those labeled, causing them to internalize a deviant self-image, and sometimes as a
result, to engage in acts of secondary deviance); Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and
the Implications for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 6 (1995).
297. Deck, 544 U.S. at 631.
298. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 25.
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What you need the shackles for, you got bailiffs, two-hundred and
fifty pound bailiffs, six foot-two and what you need shackles for
you got all these dudes, we're only a buck oh-five, need no shack-
les for us man.
- Shackled Juvenile
299
The spectacle of groups of children in 2007 herded into our juvenile courts in
belly chains connected to handcuffs and leg irons, forty years after the landmark In
re Gault decision, is a stark symbol of the legal and moral culture of the contempo-
rary juvenile court, with its assertion of power and control, and its technology of
dominion, over the bodies of the children who appear before it. The prevalence of
this practice reveals the persistent fear of juvenile violence in society and within
the juvenile justice system, which is the motivating force for this policy of contain-
ing and controlling children. The countervailing force to unshackle children is one
that seeks a measured and informed response to the problems of juvenile crime,
cognizant of the grave liberty deprivations implicated by the practice, informed by
research, and aware of the unique developmental needs of children.
As described by one international observer, the two approaches have signifi-
cant differences in outlook:
These practices will be received with mixed reactions. For some
people they will be considered a justifiable and necessary response
to the actions of children who violate accepted codes of behavior.
The punitive motivation may even be accompanied by a genuine
belief that such treatment will assist in the rehabilitation of these
children and that no other method of control exists. For others
however, they will bring about an immediate revulsion and anger
at the barbaric nature of such practices being meted out on the
most vulnerable members of society.0 °
Although Gault is celebrated as the harbinger of sweeping reforms in the pro-
tection of children's due process rights, this practice, carried out on a routine basis
in more than half of the states in the U.S., refutes that proposition. Holding chil-
dren in chains before juvenile court judges, without conducting individualized as-
sessments of their danger to public safety and other risks, is a serious repudiation
of their liberty and due process interests to be free from external restraint when
they appear before the court. Moreover, requiring all juvenile offenders be held in
restraints, shackles, and chains for their appearances in the juvenile court, without
consideration by the court of less restrictive or drastic safety precautions, is
299. Voice Project, supra note 2 (Mar. 30, 2007) (on file with author).
300. John William Tobin, Time To Remove the Shackles: The Legality of Restraints on Children Deprived of
their Liberty Under International Law, 9 INTL. J. OF CHILDREN'S RTS. 213, 213 (2001).
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counter-therapeutic in that it brands and stigmatizes them as dangerous and de-
prives them of fair and dignified hearings by a respectful and respected court.
For rehabilitative and therapeutic jurisprudence reasons, as well as for the due
process reasons articulated forty years ago by Justice Fortas in In re Gault, Florida
and other states that shackle children in the courtroom should heed the recommen-
dations of the National Juvenile Defender Center and abolish the blanket practice
of shackling detained children in court.3°1
VII. APPENDIX
State Statute Regulation Juvenile Other
Justice
Agency




CODE tit. 7, §
52.365 (2007);
ALASKA ADMIN.
CODE tit. 7, §
52.370 (2007).
Arizona Operational Guidelines &
Best Practices for Juvenile






Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. ARK. DEP'T OF HUMAN
§ 9-27-303 (2002 SERVS., Div. OF CHILDREN





California CAL. CODE REGS. Tiffany A. v. Superior
tit. 15, § 1358 Court of L.A. County, 59
(2007). Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 150 Cal.
App. 4th 1344 (Ct. App.
2007).





301. FLORIDA-AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL, supra note 14, at 5.
Unchain the Children
Connecticut CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §
19a-495-570(I I) (2007).
Delaware No specific men-
tion of restraints.
D.C. No specific men-
tion of restraints.






FLA. STAT. ANN. §
985.03 (West 2006
& Supp. 2007);



































CODE ANN. r. 63E-
2.015 (1997) (re-
pealed 2001).
FLA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE
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Hawaii STATE OF HAWAI'I, DEP'T
OF HUMAN RES. DEV.,
YOUTH CORRECTIONS
OFFICER JOB DESCRIPTION
(no specific policy, but
this job description pro-
vides that one of the duties
is maintaining security
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Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. IDAHO ADMIN. Idaho Department of
§ 16-2425 (2001). CODE r. Juvenile Corrections-
05.01.01.269 Idaho Juvenile Corrections
(2007); IDAHO Act & Rules Sec. 269;
ADMIN CODE r. 225.02; 255(g); IDAHO
05.01.02.225 PEACE OFFICER
(2007); IDAHO STANDARDS & TRAINING




Illinois ILL. ADMIN. CODE In re Staley, 7 Ill. Dec. 85,
tit. 20, § 702.160 67 II. 2d 33, 364 N.E.2d
(2007); ILL. ADMIN. 72 (1977).
CODE tit. 89, §
411.465 (2007).
Indiana Internal Policies and
Procedures unavailable.
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. IOWA ADMIN. CODE Op. Att'y Gen. (Lind)
§ 232.19 (West r. 201-50.13 (356, April 22, 1991, referenced
2006). 356A) (2007); IOWA in IOWA CODE ANN. §















Kansas KAN. ADMIN. REGS. JUVENILE OFFICE OF THE COMM'R,
§ 28-4-353a (2007); JUSTICE KAN. JUVENILE JUSTICE
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. AUTH., AUTH., OFFENDER RULE
§ 28-4-355b (2007); STATE OF BOOK.
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. KANSAS,
§ 123-5-106 (2007); COMMUNITY














of the use of re-
straints.
LA. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 22, pt. I, § 377
(2007); LA. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 22, pt. 1, §
381 (2007); LA.
ADMIN. CODE tit.
22, pt. I, § 383
(2007); LA. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 22, pt. I, §
385 (2007).
Maine No specific men-
tion of restraints.
ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §
3203-A (2003 &
Supp. 2006).
Maryland MD. ANN. CODE MD. CODE REGS. Settlement Agreement
art. 83C, § 2-118 16.18.02.04 (2007). between Maryland & DOJ
(2003 & Supp. Provision III. B. xi; U.S.




STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE STATE OF
MARYLAND.








Mississippi Policies regarding the use
of restraints developed in
response to numerous DOJ
investigations.
Missouri STATE OF MISSOURI,




Montana MONT. ADMIN. R.
20.9.630 (2007).
Nebraska 83 NEB. ADMIN.
CODE § 8-007
(2007); 390 NEB.
ADMIN. CODE § 1 -
002 (2007).
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Nevada I Juveniles to be










New No specific men-
tion of restraints.
Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 169-B:1
(2002).
New Jersey N.J. ADMIN. CODE §
13:92-7.5 (2007).
New Mexico N.M. CODE R. §
8.14.1.12 (2007)
8.14.21.
New York N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 18, §
441.17 (2007); 18
NYADC 181.8.
North Carolina 2007 N.C. Sess. N.C. DEP'T
Laws 100, amend- OF JUVENILE
ing N.C. GEN. JUSTICE &















North Dakota Nothing specific on
juveniles and re- In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d
straints, but the use 326 (N.D. 2007).
of restraints on
children in group
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Ohio OHIO ADMIN. CODE
5139:35-19 (2007).
Oklahoma
Oregon OR. ADMIN. R. 416- In re Millican, 138 Or.
490-0010 (2007). App. 142, 906 P.2d 857,
860 (Ct. App. 1995).
Pennsylvania 55 PA. CODE § JUVENILE DET. CENTERS3800.209 - ASS'N OF PA., USE OF
211(2007); 55 PA. RESTRICTIVE
CODE § 3800.274 PROCEDURES IN SECURE
(2007). JUVENILE DETENTION
FACILITIES; JUVENILE
DET. CENTERS ASS'N OF
PA., JUVENILE DETENTION
PROGRAM STANDARDS.
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS §
42-72-15 (2006);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §
42-72.9-4 (2006).
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § S.C. CODE ANN. S.C. DEP'T OF JUVENILE
44-24-280 (2002). REGS. 114-590 JUSTICE, COMMUNITY
(2007). SERVICES MANUAL.
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 26-1 IA-
23 (2004).
Tennessee TENN. COMP. R. &
REGS. 1400-2-.13
(2007).
Texas 37 TEX. ADMIN. TEX. TEX. YOUTH COMM'N,















































Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. In re B.F., 157 Vt. 67, 595
tit. 18, § 7511 A2d 280 (1991); H. 0306.
(Supp. 2006); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§ 5534 (2001 &
Supp. 2006).
Virginia 6 VA. ADMIN. CODE§ 20-50-20 (2007); 6
VA. ADMIN. CODE §
20-50-110 (2007); 6
VA. ADMIN. CODE §
20-230-160 (2007);
6 VA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 23; 6 VA. ADMIN.
CODE § 35-60-575
(2007); 6 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 35-
140-280 (2007); 6
VA. ADMIN. CODE §
35-140-670 (2007);
6 VA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 35-140-680
(2007); 6 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 35-
140-685 (2007); 6
VA. ADMIN. CODE §
35-140-690 (2007);
6 VA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 35-150-10 (2007);
6 VA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 35-150-680
(2007).












Wisconsin WIS. ADMIN. CODE
DEP'T OF CORRS. §
346.04 (2007); WIS.
ADMIN. CODE
DEP'T OF CORRS. §
346.31 (2007); WiS.
ADMIN. CODE
DEP'T OF CORRS. §
373.03 (2007); WIs.
ADMIN. CODE
DEP'T OF CORRS. §
376.03 (2007); WiS.
ADMIN. CODE
DEP'T OF CORRS. §
376.09 (2007); WIS.
ADMIN. CODE
DEP'T OF CORRS. §
393.03 (2007).
Wyoming WYo. DEP'T OF FAMILY
SERVS., RULES &
REGULATIONS: CH. 5, § 6;
WYO. DEP'T OF FAMILY
SERVS., RULES &
REGULATIONS: CH. 7, § 8.
